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Abstract 
Turkey has shown that it can achieve very high growth rates on a sustainable basis, provided 
there is political stability. In this regard, the prospect of becoming a full member of the EU is 
the strongest anchor for political, and hence economic, stability.  
Currently, Turkey’s young population offers a window of opportunity for building up its socio-
economic infrastructure. But the low level of labour force participation, particularly among 
urban women, is a major constraint. Participation rates in Turkey are highly correlated with the 
level of education, in which women have been at a disadvantage. 
Compared with most EU countries, Turkey is characterised by a greater degree of inequality and 
a higher risk of poverty, yet the existing structures to promote social inclusion are widely 
dispersed. Notably, one-third of the population lives in rural areas, while the share of agriculture 
in GDP is about a third of that level. The pace and pattern of urbanisation will shape Turkey’s 
future economic and geographical landscape. Against this background, the expansion of off-
farm employment and income generation in rural areas would help to reduce migration to the 
cities. 
Sectoral and microeconomic factors also restrain Turkey’s economic growth. Deregulation and 
privatisation efforts are taking place, however, in core sectors such as energy, 
telecommunications and transport. Further attention needs to be given to improving the 
competitiveness of SMEs, particularly through less burdensome business regulations and 
increased opportunities for SMEs to access capital. Payroll taxes and severance payments are 
significantly above the average for OECD countries. These costs, together with stiff labour 
legislation, account for a very sizable informal sector.  
Turkey’s social security system is going through a major overhaul, geared towards institutional 
reform, the restoration of actuarial balances and health-care reform to improve access to medical 
care. In addition to structural reform, the greatest challenge that Turkey faces is ‘good 
governance’. In these and other areas, the EU provides the blueprint. 
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Executive Summary 
Particularly since 2002, Turkey has demonstrated that it can achieve very high growth rates on a 
sustainable basis, provided there is political stability. The prospect of becoming a full member 
of the EU is the strongest anchor for political, and hence economic, stability.  
Turkey’s young population offers a window of opportunity for building up its socio-economic 
infrastructure. To exploit this opportunity, Turkey has to achieve high levels of economic 
growth and employment. Very low levels of labour force participation are a major problem in 
this respect, especially among women, whose labour market participation in urban areas is much 
poorer (at half the level) compared with that of women in rural areas. 
Participation rates are highly (positively) correlated with the level of education and that is where 
the women are at a disadvantage. While the gender divide in schooling among youth has 
narrowed considerably, the difference persists in the population of working age. In urban areas 
while 7 out of 10 women with tertiary degrees participate in the labour market, fewer than 1 in 
10 women with less than secondary education join the labour force. 
Despite the fact that Turkey has experienced relatively high growth rates in the last few years, 
the per capita income is still very low compared with EU levels. This, coupled with a highly 
skewed income distribution that prevails in the country compared with the EU-25 averages, 
makes the poverty problem a significant one. Turkey is characterised by a greater degree of 
inequality and a higher risk of poverty than any of the EU-25 countries are, and the existing 
structures to promote social inclusion are widely dispersed. 
Living conditions are not only determined by a household’s income position but also depend on 
access to some material living standards, work/life balance, housing conditions and the local 
environment. The analysis, in this context, reveals that efforts are still needed to create a better 
city infrastructure – especially concerning access to gas, piped water and sewerage – and to 
improve the telecommunications penetration across the country. In addition, spatial conditions 
in Turkey are reported to be substantially worse than in the EU-15. Along with the problems 
related to housing conditions, the inhabitants of Turkey complain about local environmental 
concerns, such as a lack of green space, air pollution, water quality and noise. Of course, the 
work/life balance is also an important aspect of quality of life. Working hours in Turkey are the 
highest among European countries for which data are available and the citizens of Turkey have 
much more difficulty in reconciling work and family life than the populations of the EU-25. 
Another major challenge is the transformation of agriculture. About one-third of the population 
lives in rural areas, while the share of agriculture in GDP is well below half that level. The pace 
and pattern of urbanisation will shape Turkey’s economic and geographical landscape. The 
expansion of off-farm employment and income generation in rural areas would help to reduce 
migration to the cities. 
Sectoral and microeconomic factors pose major difficulties for the sustainability of economic 
growth. Gains in productivity in hitherto protected sectors where the state has remained an 
active player emerge as the critical issue. Deregulation and privatisation efforts are underway in 
core sectors such as energy, telecommunications and transport. The EU provides a blueprint for 
the regulatory path in these areas.  
The dual structure of the Turkish economy, where outward-oriented and competitive modern 
firms co-exist with traditional, family-owned, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has 
to converge. Turkey needs to improve the competitiveness of its significant SME segment. Less 
burdensome business regulations and increased opportunities for SMEs to access capital are 
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More than half of all employment is in the informal sector. In terms of manufacturing labour 
costs per unit of value added, Turkish labour costs are considerably lower than in Eastern 
European countries such as Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, payroll taxes and severance 
payments are significantly above the average for OECD countries. These costs, together with 
stiff labour legislation, account for a very sizable informal sector. The legislation has to shift 
from protecting jobs to protecting workers. 
Currently, the social security system in Turkey is going through a major overhaul. The 
legislative changes that are near completion mainly have three goals:  
i)  institutional reform to restructure the organisationally fractured system by creating an 
umbrella agency for coordinating the public provision of all social insurance and social 
assistance services, while harmonising the eligibility conditions and the calculation of 
benefits provided by individual agencies;  
ii)  reform of the parameters to restore actuarial balances so as to help curb the rapidly 
growing deficits of the publicly managed social-security system; and 
iii)  health care reform to improve access to medical care by all segments of society. 
Against this background, if we set aside minor issues that require continued structural reform, 
the greatest challenge that Turkey faces is of a political rather than economic nature. The issue 
is ‘good governance’. There is widespread agreement in academia and in business and local 
government circles, that Turkey’s economy and society have reached a level at which it can no 
longer be centrally managed from Ankara. In fact, the style of political governance in the 
country is in the process of transformation, from a paternalistic, top-down and patronage-based 
modality to a form of transparent and efficient government that is responsive to citizens’ 
demands, that acknowledges its citizens as stakeholders in decision-making and that allows for 
stakeholder participation in the decision-making process. There is no doubt that without an 
effective functioning of the principle of good governance, Turkey’s efforts to catch up with the 
EU in terms of democratisation, growth and development will be severely hindered.  
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1. Introduction 
Turkey is situated at a regional crossroads of strategic importance for Europe and is a regional 
power in terms of population, economic and geographical size. Its territory is located mainly in 
the Anatolian peninsula in south-western Asia, with a portion in the Balkan region of south-
eastern Europe. It is roughly rectangular in shape and is 1,660 kilometres wide. Turkey’s area 
inclusive of lakes is 814,578 square kilometres. With its population of about 70 million, Turkey 
is broadly equivalent to the 10 new member states taken together and accounts for 15.5% of the 
EU-25 population. The classification of the regions in the country used to be totally based on 
administrative divisions, which involved 7 regions and 81 provinces. Turkey adopted European 
statistical classification of region (NUTS) in September 2002 and is now divided, for statistical 
and regional development purposes, into 12 NUTS I, 26 NUTS II and 81 NUTS III regions. 
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, constitutional republic, whose political system 
was established in 1923. Turkey is a member of international organisations such as the United 
Nations, OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, the OECD and the Stability Pact for South-East 
Europe, the Economic Cooperation Organisation and the Islamic Conference Organisation. It is 
starting membership negotiations with the European Union.  
The capital city of Turkey is Ankara, but the historic capital Istanbul remains the financial, 
economic and cultural centre of the country. Two-thirds of the total Turkish population lives in 
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other large cities such as Bursa, Adana, Trabzon, Malatya, 
Gaziantep, Erzurum, Kayseri, Izmit (Kocaeli), Konya, Mersin, Eskisehir, Diyarbakir, Antalya 
and Samsun. Over 80% of the total value added is generated in these cities, which have 
experienced high levels of migration from rural areas over the last few decades. 
Turkey’s young population offers a window of opportunity for building up its socio-economic 
infrastructure. To exploit this opportunity, Turkey has to achieve high levels of employment and 
economic growth. Very low levels of labour force participation are a major problem in this 
respect, particularly for women. Participation rates are highly correlated with level of education 
and that is where women are at a disadvantage.  
The second major task is the transformation of agriculture. About one-third of the population 
lives in rural areas while the share of agriculture in GDP is considerably less than half that. The 
pace and pattern of urbanisation will shape Turkey’s economic and geographical landscape. The 
expansion of off-farm employment and income generation in rural areas would help to reduce 
migration to the cities. 
Against this background, if we set aside minor issues that require continued structural reform, 
the greatest challenge that Turkey faces is of a political rather than economic nature. The 
political cohesion and the governing majority have been riding on a popular consensus around 
EU membership. Political obstacles on this road slow down the momentum of the country 
directly and indirectly by reducing the pace of reforms and by increasing risks, and thus 
lowering investment. Some of these political obstacles have domestic origins while others stem 
from problems within the EU or the EU member states. The role of the military, the minorities 
and the Cyprus issues are major items in this list. 
As regards structural reforms, Turkey constitutes an interesting case study. The devastating 
financial and economic crisis of 2001 brought to the fore the need for structural reforms. As a 
result, a number of important structural reforms were undertaken, such as the consolidation of 
the banking sector, the establishment of new or strengthening of existing independent regulatory 
authorities and fiscal reform aimed at containing public sector deficits. The EU regulatory 
framework has provided a blueprint for these reforms.  2 | ADAMAN, CARKOGLU, ERZAN, FILIZTEKIN, OZKAYNAK, SAYAN & ULGEN 
Since 2002, Turkey has demonstrated that it can achieve very high growth rates on a sustainable 
basis, provided there is political stability. The prospect of becoming a full member of the EU is 
the strongest anchor for political, and hence economic, stability. The availability of long-term 
capital, particularly FDI flows, is contingent on this prospect. Challenges remain, however. The 
path to long-term sustained growth will depend on the ability of Turkish authorities to continue 
with these reforms. 
The sub-sections of this report cover issues related to macroeconomic policies, labour market 
and demographic trends, social protection, taxation, living conditions and governance in further 
detail. 
2.  General economic trends 
2.1 Macroeconomic  developments 
2.1.1 Main  trends 
Turkey has a significant capacity to achieve annual economic growth rates in the range of 6-
10%.
1 The 1990s were a lost period owing to political business cycles under weak coalition 
governments, culminating in the 2001 crisis. Thanks to the major structural reform called forth 
by the crisis – which has been maintained with the help of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and EU anchors, and a majority government since 2002 that has adhered to fiscal 
discipline – this high growth potential has once again been realised. The source of growth has 
been investment and exports as well as consumer demand. These developments have been very 
healthy because they have been driven by the private sector, in terms of both consumption and 
investment. Regarding sector shares, manufacturing and services have accounted for most of the 
growth while agriculture and mining have lagged behind. Recent years have seen the revival of 
the construction sector as the economy has stabilised. In 2005, construction grew by nearly 
20%. 
Export growth was particularly strong in the early years of the rapid recovery. Lately, there has 
been a slowdown in the growth of exports, partly stemming from the appreciation of the Turkish 
currency. Major increases in labour productivity have partially compensated for currency 
appreciation. Exports are predominantly manufactured goods. Traditionally, the engine has been 
textiles and clothing. Currently, the most dynamic export sector is automobiles and auto parts. 
Thanks to the customs union with the EU, Turkey had been exempt from textile quotas while its 
major rivals had been constrained by them. The abolition of quotas in 2005 by the World Trade 
Organisation removed the disadvantage of the competitors and hence contributed to the slowing 
down of Turkish textile exports. Competition from China and India is accelerating the change in 
Turkey’s comparative advantage. Turkish exporters are forced to seek higher value-added items. 
Turkey’s customs union with the EU, which took effect in 1996, has considerably increased 
import penetration in Turkey. The main effect has been trade creation; hence, the share of 
imports from the EU has not increased much. The customs union implied drastic liberalisation 
in imports of final goods. Also, many producers have started using more imported inputs instead 
of domestic ones. This trend has been having an important impact, especially at times when the 
Turkish currency has appreciated in real terms. With the current structure of the economy and 
the customs union, high rates of economic growth yield large trade deficits. Increased revenues 
from tourism partially compensate for this development. Nevertheless, in 2005, the current 
account deficit surpassed 6% of GDP. 
                                                 
1 Turkey’s economic record reveals its high growth capacity. Projections for growth also corroborate this 
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The current account deficit is not simply a consequence of high growth. Capital inflows, both 
short and long term, finance growth and lead to currency appreciation, which in turn contributes 
to the deterioration of the current account. This situation increases the vulnerability of the 
economy to external shocks. In May 2006, as the global liquidity condition deteriorated after the 
further rise in the US Federal Reserve rate, the Turkish lira was the most affected currency 
among emerging markets. 
The long-term solution for sustainable high growth with reduced vulnerability is a higher 
savings rate and a higher share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in external capital flows. The 
latter is happening. The inflow of FDI, which barely reached $1 billion per year in the 1990s, 
has shifted to a new level of around $5 billion as the economy has emerged from the recent 
crisis with the help of major structural reforms. Privatisation has also played a significant role in 
this development. In 2006, FDI is expected to shift to a higher level and reach $20 billion. 
There is a large unregistered economy estimated at between 30% and 50% of the official GDP 
(Zenginobuz, 2005). This is on the higher end for developing countries, which average 40%, 
and is considerably above the 17% estimate of the OECD average. A key factor in this 
phenomenon is the incentive structure embedded in the taxation system. Weaknesses in the rule 
of law and corruption control are recognised as other important, contributory factors. Reform 
proposals are being considered to lower the tax rates and expand the tax base. The share of the 
overall tax burden in GDP is reaching average OECD levels and there is an excessive tax wedge 
on labour, which puts Turkey at the top of the OECD countries. The World Bank has produced 
a number of valuable studies on the Turkish tax system and guidelines for reform. 
2.1.2  Prices and money 
Turkey has had high (double-digit) and chronic inflation since the early 1970s. In 2000, a 
serious disinflation programme was launched using the exchange rate as an anchor. In 2001, the 
programme failed as a banking crisis erupted. Following the crisis, together with major reforms 
of the financial and fiscal systems, a new programme was launched that pulled the inflation rate 
down to single digits. 
The central bank has attained a fully autonomous status and begun targeting inflation. The target 
for 2006 is 5% with a plus/minus band of 2%. After the currency realignment in May–June 
2006, given that the Turkish lira has depreciated considerably, the expected pass through to 
prices will require a revision of the inflation target. The good news in this respect is that, as the 
turmoil in international financial markets has subsided, the exchange rate for the Turkish lira 
has largely moved back (as of August). The central bank uses its overnight lending and 
borrowing rate and open market operations as its main instruments. It also intervenes in the 
foreign exchange market but does not have a declared target for the exchange rate. 
As the fiscal stance of the government and the public sector has improved and crowding out has 
reduced, banks have been trying to expand the credit they offer to the private sector, including 
consumer credit and home loans. There was major expansion in the latter as interest rates came 
down considerably prior to the May 2006 disturbance in the markets. 
Maturity mismatch remains a pressing concern in Turkish banking. Long-term loans are mainly 
financed by short-term deposits. Legislation regulating home loans is underway. The proposed 
mortgage system would contribute to longer-term funding by opening ways for asset 
securitisation. 
2.1.3  General fiscal trends 
Government tax and other revenues showed a rapid increase in the 1990s, from below 20% of 
GDP to above 30%. Expenditures surpassed this increase and resulted in a huge public sector 4 | ADAMAN, CARKOGLU, ERZAN, FILIZTEKIN, OZKAYNAK, SAYAN & ULGEN 
borrowing requirement, which reached 15% during the 2001 crisis. With the IMF-sponsored 
stabilisation programme, a 6.5% primary budget surplus was achieved in 2002. Including the 
interest payments, the overall fiscal deficit was brought below 3% of GDP by 2005.  
The sustainability of public debt has improved considerably thanks to high GDP growth, low 
interest rates and risk spread, and favourable exchange-rate developments. In the first quarter of 
2006, the total public debt/GDP ratio gave signals that by 2007 it would fall below 60% (the EU 
benchmark). Yet tightening in the international liquidity conditions may change the outlook 
concerning interest rates, the exchange rate and GDP growth. Consequently, the debt dynamics 
may not be as comfortable. 
2.1.4  Regional economic characteristics 
Existing literature shows that there is no absolute convergence in either GDP per capita or in 
productivity levels among provinces. There are significant differences in the sectoral structure 
of regions. The less developed eastern and south-eastern regions mostly specialise in 
agricultural production, whereas in the west and the north-west manufacturing is dominant. The 
western and southern regions also benefit from the tourism industry. Regional imbalances along 
the east–west axis are among the top challenges for Turkey. Table 1 presents the sectoral shares 
of production and employment across the regions and reveals the disparities.
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Table 1. Sectoral distribution of production and employment across regions, 2000 (in %) 
Production 
Turkey Marmara Aegean Mediterranean Black Sea  Central  Eastern
Agriculture 14.0  5.7 16.6 19.6 24.0  14.4  27.9
Mining 1.4  0.3 3.0 0.9 1.7  1.7  3.6
Manufacturing 24.8  34.0 24.7 19.3 21.2  15.7  11.8
Energy 3.3  3.3 4.6 2.7 2.7  2.4  4.4
Construction 5.2  4.0 4.6 5.1 4.8  9.0  5.7
Commerce 23.3  26.2 22.1 25.1 18.1  22.3  17.0
Transportation 13.7  12.2 12.2 15.2 16.3  16.4  13.4
Banking 7.5  8.7 6.5 5.7 4.3  10.0  5.1
Other services  6.7  5.6 5.8 6.5 6.9  8.0  11.1
Employment 
Turkey Marmara Aegean Mediterranean Black Sea  Central  Eastern
Agriculture 48.4  25.3 50.5 55.0 66.1  46.8  64.0
Mining 0.4  0.2 0.6 0.1 0.8  0.4  0.1
Manufacturing 12.6  25.1 12.8 8.3 6.2  9.6  4.6
Energy 0.4  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3  0.5  0.3
Construction 4.6  5.8 4.2 4.5 4.1  4.8  3.4
Commerce 9.7  14.3 10.1 10.5 6.0  8.9  5.3
Transportation 3.3  4.8 3.0 3.0 2.2  3.4  2.2
Banking 3.1  5.4 2.6 2.3 1.4  4.0  1.1
Other services  17.6  18.8 15.7 16.0 12.9  21.5  18.9
Source: National Account Statistics and Population Census, TURKSTAT. 
                                                 
2  Data on the regional distribution of employment come from the population census and the latest 
available ones pertain to 2000. These data are not in full conformity with the quarterly household surveys 
on which labour market statistics are based. BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON TURKEY | 5 
 
2.2  Labour market trends and main issues 
2.2.1 Main  trends 
High population growth rates for many decades coupled with urbanisation are straining the 
labour market. Between 1990 and 2004, the population of working age increased by 39.2%, 
while in the same period the labour force and employment increased by 21.6% and 17.5%, 
respectively. As a result, the employment rate (the percentage of the adult population that is 
employed) is one of the lowest in the world. In 2004, it was only 43.7%. Most countries have 
employment rates above 50% (World Bank, 2006).
3 
A major problem of the Turkish labour market is the low level of labour force participation 
(LFP), especially among women in urban areas. The overall LFP rate is about 49%, with 72% 
for men and 25% for women. A significant number of women who are not working are in fact 
not looking for employment, mostly owing to their lack of skills and education. As Turkey has 
urbanised and families have moved out of agriculture, the employment rates for women have 
fallen significantly because their low average skill levels have not been suitable for employment 
in urban services or industries. Consequently, women of prime working age are employed at 
less than half the rate in the EU-25. In Turkey, the LFP rate for urban women has remained 
under 20% for the last 15 years. The importance of education and skills in this respect is 
illustrated by the fact that university-educated young women have participation rates that are 
close to those of men.  
The LFP of men increases significantly with a tertiary degree in both urban and rural areas. For 
men, secondary or less than secondary education makes little difference in terms of LFP. Only 
11% of women in urban areas with less than a secondary degree participate in the labour 
market. This figure nearly triples with a secondary degree and reaches 70% with a tertiary 
degree. 
At present, the Turkish labour market is one of the most regulated markets in Europe according 
to the recent World Bank study (2006). There is a very large informal sector, however. Its 
presence partly stems from high payroll taxes, severance payments and restrictions on 
temporary work, and partly from the weak rule of law. 
Unregistered employment (defined as employed persons who are not registered with any social 
security institution) accounts for 52% of total employment. Within the agricultural sector, 
sector, 90% is unregistered. This figure is 34% in the non-agricultural sectors and 41% among 
wage earners in the private sector. 
In the next decade, job creation in Turkey is crucial, which requires solid and persistent growth. 
It is estimated that an annual GDP growth of at least 6% is required to keep unemployment at 
bay, as higher growth rates increase participation rates as well as job creation (TUSIAD, 2002 
and 2004).  
Having a young population represents an opportunity for Turkey. Yet, exploiting this 
opportunity requires increasing labour market participation and employment rates. 
After the 2001 crisis, total employment fell in both 2002 and 2003. In 2004, employment 
increased by about 650,000 – roughly equal to the increase in the labour force. While the rate of 
the population increase is flattening, reductions in employment in the agricultural sector are 
putting a greater emphasis on job creation in non-agricultural sectors. 
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2.2.2  Structure of employment and wages 
The share of agriculture in total employment is very high. One-third of the population is still 
employed in agriculture, but this share is expected to halve in the coming two decades. The 
rapid mechanisation of production, improved seed quality and other technical advances augment 
labour productivity. These changes combined with reduced government subsidies to the 
agricultural sector will surely accelerate the detachment from agriculture.  
Industry accounts for about one-fifth of employment, while the rest is in the services sector. 
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels have been the engine of employment growth 
in the services sector. Tourism appears to be an important area that could offer significant 
employment opportunities, and its development will surely play a primary role in employment 
generation. A rapid surge has also taken place in finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services.  
Data on employment by firm size are available for the manufacturing sector until 1999. In the 
1980s, the share of small enterprises with 10 to 24 persons engaged accounted for about 14% of 
all firms. These surveys excluded micro firms with up to 9 persons. The share of medium-sized 
firms with 25-99 persons was about 25% and it was about 60% for larger firms with more than 
100 persons engaged. By the end of the 1990s, the share of small firms providing employment 
shrank significantly to 6% while the large firms’ share approached 70%. The medium-sized 
firms retained their share. 
In terms of manufacturing labour costs per unit of value added, Turkish labour costs (0.27) are 
lower than are those of Eastern European countries such as Poland (0.61) and Hungary (0.54). 
On the other hand, payroll taxes are considerably above the average for OECD countries. High 
payroll taxes, severance payments and stiff labour legislation together fuel the informal sector.  
During the high inflation period, nominal wage hikes only temporarily lifted real wages. 
Following crises, the burden of macroeconomic adjustment was mostly on real wages. As a 
result, while output has fluctuated considerably, employment has been relatively stable (World 
Bank, 2006). As inflation has recently been brought under control, real wage adjustments may 
become more difficult. Eventual jumps in nominal wages will not be eroded by inflation. 
Therefore, excessive wage increases may affect Turkey’s competitiveness.  
2.2.3  Structure of unemployment 
In Turkey, aggregate figures of unemployment reveal relatively low levels of unemployment 
compared with several EU countries. Nevertheless, as also mentioned by the Economic 
Research Forum & Institut de la Méditerranée (2005) and the World Bank (2006), aggregate 
unemployment rates conceal an important structural problem in unemployment and can be 
misleading. The share of agriculture in total employment is very high, and self-employed and 
unpaid family workers constitute the bulk of employment in this sector. By definition, unpaid 
family members working in agriculture are not considered unemployed and therefore low levels 
of unemployment in agriculture artificially decrease total unemployment rates. Put differently, 
the hidden unemployment in agriculture is a large labour reservoir with prospects of major 
outflows. 
The unemployment rate is especially high among the young population. A recent phenomenon 
in Turkey is increasing unemployment among the more educated segments of society. Here, 
both demand and supply factors are likely to matter. The higher rate of unemployment among 
the educated labour force is not only brought about by the deficiencies of the education system, 
but also caused by the failure of sufficient job creation to absorb skilled labour (World Bank, 
2006).  BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON TURKEY | 7 
 
The Turkish Employment Organisation (ISKUR) was reorganised in 2000 in line with the 
European employment strategy. Still, it lacks resources for active labour market programmes 
that are effective. Unemployment insurance has recently been introduced and major funds have 
been accumulating in this account because of very limited eligibility requirements. 
2.2.4  Regional and ethnic dimensions  
The regional characteristics of labour market conditions follow the level of industrialisation 
depicted in the section on regional economic characteristics (section 2.1.4.). 
Labour market statistics in Turkey are based on quarterly household surveys on the labour force. 
Data from these surveys do not allow for regional decomposition. The latest information on 
regional labour market conditions is from the 2000 population census. The unemployment and 
LFP rates (Tables 2 and 3) based on the census do not entirely reveal the major disparities 
among the regions. These data are not fully compatible with the labour market survey data. That 
being stated, labour market characteristics are largely determined by the urban–rural, gender and 
educational divides. No data are available on the ethnic dimension in the labour market. 
Table 2. Unemployment by region, 2000 (in %) 
  Unemployment rates 
  Total Men  Women 
Turkey   8.9  9.9  7.2 
Marmara 10.1  9.6  11.1 
Aegean 6.8  7.0  6.5 
Mediterranean 9.4  10.7  7.3 
Black Sea   6.6  8.1  4.5 
Central 8.5  9.2  7.2 
Eastern 11.0  14.2  5.5 
Source: 2000 population census, TURKSTAT. 
Table 3. Labour force participation rates by region, 2000 (in %) 
  Labour force participation rates 
  Total Men  Women 
Turkey   65.3  83.0  47.1 
Marmara 62.0  84.1  38.7 
Aegean   69.8  85.7  53.4 
Mediterranean   65.3  81.2  49.3 
Black Sea   72.3  85.0  59.9 
Central 61.4  80.6  42.1 
Eastern 66.0  81.8  49.4 
Source: 2000 population census, TURKSTAT. 
2.3  Structural reforms – Level, current pace and plans 
2.3.1 Identification  of  the main structural problems and challenges 
For a very long time, the economy was characterised by macroeconomic instability. Therefore, 
public policies were focused on its containment. The economic environment changed 
considerably after the financial crisis 2001, when a stabilisation programme was introduced and 
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Apart from the all-encompassing issues such as political and economic stability along with 
education, sectoral and micro-economic factors pose major difficulties for the sustainability of 
economic growth. In this context, the structural problems facing the Turkish economy in the 
medium term are essentially twofold. The first relates to gains in productivity in hitherto 
protected sectors where the state has remained an active player. Deregulation and privatisation 
efforts are underway in core sectors such as energy, telecommunications and transport. The EU 
provides a blueprint for the regulatory path in these areas. 
The second concern in this context is linked to the dual structure of the Turkish economy, where 
outward-oriented and competitive modern firms co-exist with traditional, family-owned SMEs. 
Turkey needs to improve the competitiveness of its substantial SME segment. Less burdensome 
business regulations and increased opportunities for SMEs to access capital are urgently needed. 
2.3.2 Ownership  structure and privatisation 
Turkey has traditionally had a development policy based on private ownership. The state’s 
interference in the economy was considerable, however. As such, state economic enterprises 
were prevalent in the industrial sector as well as in services and were predominant in utilities. 
Privatisation efforts that were initiated in the early 1980s stalled because of political and legal 
uncertainties over a long period. It was only after the establishment of macroeconomic and 
political stability a few years ago that the privatisation process gained a new impetus. 
Privatisation proceeds in 2005 reached a record of $20 billion.
4 
As a result, state involvement in the manufacturing industry is now limited to a few companies 
slated for privatisation. It should nonetheless be highlighted that among these, Petkim is the 
largest petrochemicals company in the country and Tekel is still among the top players in the 
tobacco industry. Other state-owned companies operate in the textiles, mining, iron and steel, 
and sugar industries. 
2.3.3  Institutional and legal reforms 
In parallel with efforts to prepare the Turkish economy for EU accession, a string of 
liberalisation and deregulation measures have been implemented in the services industries and 
in particular as regards state-owned utilities. An electricity law and a gas market law both 
adopted in 2001 aim at gradually opening these markets to full competition. Energy production 
has traditionally been open to private investment. Now state-owned power facilities as well as 
the state-owned transmission operator have been slated for privatisation in 2007. In the 
meantime, the tendering of concession rights for regional electricity distribution will occur.  
The liberalisation of the natural gas market was also foreseen and the tendering of regional 
distribution rights to private companies is continuing. Yet the process is hindered by the state-
owned Petroleum Pipeline Corporation’s (BOTAS) de facto monopoly of imports. Furthermore, 
the transmission infrastructure is also held by BOTAS.  
In telecommunications, the incumbent Turkish Telecom was successfully privatised in 2005. In 
all these areas, Turkey established independent regulatory authorities to monitor the transition to 
full competition.  
In the area of competition policy, Turkey is generally considered a success story by the OECD. 
A competition law, based on the principles of EU competition law, was adopted in 1994 and 
entered into force with the establishment of the competition authority in 1997. Since then, the 
Turkish competition authority has established itself at both the domestic and the international 
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level as a highly competent, independent and credible institution. The implementation of 
competition rules in Turkey proceeded swiftly and it can now be contended that awareness 
about competition rules and the culture of competition are well ingrained in the business 
community. 
There are two structural issues, however, limiting the effectiveness of the Turkish competition 
authority. The first one relates to the difficulties of judicial review, where a lack of pertinent 
competence at the higher administrative court (Danistay) undermines the good and timely 
implementation of the competition authority’s decisions. The second shortcoming relates to the 
limited scope of competition law, which exempts state aids from its the ambit. Although Turkey 
is under the obligation through its customs union with the EU to establish a state-aid monitoring 
authority and to adopt a state-aid regime in line with EU practices, there has been no progress 
on this front.  
Banking. The Turkish banking sector has undergone a series of reforms since the early 2000s. 
The severe economic crisis of 2001 necessitated banking reforms. The economic stabilisation 
package introduced as a response to the crisis had a focus on the banking sector. It addressed the 
structural deficiencies of Turkish banking. It enhanced the prudential monitoring of banks, 
strengthened capital adequacy requirements and increased the transparency of non-performing 
loans. It also led to the closure or merger of the weaker banks and the re-capitalisation of most 
of the remaining banks. In short, the banking reforms of 2001 sanitised the banking industry and 
paved the way for a more sustainable and less crisis-prone development of the banking sector in 
Turkey. 
The costs of the banking reforms were significant, even from a comparative perspective. It has 
been estimated that the costs of these reforms reached 36% of GDP. 
The second wave of structural change related to Turkish banking is the internationalisation of 
the domestic banking scene. Although Turkey has traditionally maintained a liberal policy for 
capital flows, stemming from chronic macroeconomic instability, the share of foreign banks in 
the domestic market remained limited. Foreign banks, with the exception of a few, restricted 
their exposure to the Turkish market and refrained from entering the retail business, focusing 
instead on either corporate or investment banking activities. This strategy has begun to change 
in earnest in recent years. A wave of acquisitions and mergers, reaching a peak in 2005–06, led 
to a significantly higher share of international banks in Turkey. This share, which was 3% in 
2002, exceeded 15% in 2005. 
The remaining issues for the banking sector in Turkey are twofold. The state-owned banks have 
been scheduled for privatisation. Owing to the high share of these banks in the total assets of the 
banking sector, the privatisation of the remaining state-held banks will be important as regards 
the future health and dynamics of the Turkish banking industry. The second concern is the 
growth of its bankable domestic customer base and especially the SME market. As Turkey will 
adopt the Basel II principles, Turkish SMEs that have not achieved a certain level of financial 
transparency and accountability will find it more difficult or at least more costly to deal with 
domestic banks. The transformation of Turkish SMEs will contribute to the future growth of 
Turkish banks. The faster local SMEs transform themselves and comply with international 
standards in the area of transparency and accountability, the more sustainable will be the growth 
performance of Turkish banks facing the twin challenges of internationalisation and increased 
competition. 
Business regulation. From an international and comparative perspective, business regulation in 
Turkey is an area where concrete progress is needed. Turkish business regulation is generally 
burdensome, complex, non-transparent and unpredictable in nature. These structural 
impediments are among the root causes of the significant size of the informal economy in the 10 | ADAMAN, CARKOGLU, ERZAN, FILIZTEKIN, OZKAYNAK, SAYAN & ULGEN 
country. According to the OECD (2004), “to create a rules-based, transparent and non-
discriminatory institutional environment for the business sector that contributes to enhanced 
economic efficiency” is one of the key structural changes needed in Turkey.  
2.3.4 Education 
The education system in Turkey is among the key ingredients of the policy mix aiming at 
building social cohesion, reducing regional and gender disparities and improving the average 
qualification level, and thus helping to increase the alarmingly low LFP and employment rates. 
The analysis of employment data by region, gender and education confirms that education can 
play a very important role in this respect. In order to achieve these objectives, the quality of 
educational provision needs to improve. 
In 2000, the average number of years of school attendance for the working-age population (15-
64) in Turkey was 7.3 years,
5 which was much lower than the European average. The share of 
the population that had less than five years of education (low skilled) was 62% and the share of 
tertiary school graduates was just 7%. Educational attainment, however, varies by gender and 
region. Women typically have less education, particularly in the eastern regions. More than 80% 
of women have less than five years of education. There are also significant regional disparities. 
The number of years spent in school drops to around five in the poorer eastern regions. In these 
provinces, the gender differential also rises, reaching a ratio of one to two years (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Regional and gender disparities in educational attainment 
  Years of schooling  Share of population 
that has less than five 
years of education (%) 
Share of population 
that has college 
education (%) 
 Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women 
Istanbul 8.1  8.7  7.5  56.2  50.8  69.4  9.8  11.1  8.4 
Western  Marmara  7.5 8.1  6.8  63.6  56.7  82.5  6.5 7.9  5.0 
Aegean  7.4 8.1  6.7  64.5  57.8  81.9  7.4 8.7  6.0 
Eastern  Marmara  7.6 8.4  6.8  60.8  51.8  81.7  6.5 8.1  4.8 
West Anatolia  8.3  9.1  7.5  53.5  44.4  73.6  10.9  12.8  8.9 
Mediterranean  7.3 8.2  6.4  62.1  54.1  82.4  6.9 8.6  5.1 
Central  Anatolia 7.1  8.2  5.9  64.3  52.8 86.9  5.2  7.2  3.2 
Western Black 
Sea 
6.8 7.8  5.7  68.8  58.3  88.6  5.1 6.9  3.3 
Eastern  Black  Sea  7.1 8.3  5.9  62.4  51.6  86.2  5.5 7.5  3.4 
North-east 
Anatolia 
6.4 7.9  4.9  66.5  53.7  89.7  4.6 6.6  2.5 
Central east 
Anatolia 
6.1 7.8  4.5  66.0  52.8  89.5  4.8 6.8  2.7 
South-east 
Anatolia 
5.4 7.1  3.8  72.9  61.3  92.0  3.7 5.5  2.0 
Turkey  7.3 8.2  6.3  62.4  53.7  82.1  7.0 8.7  5.3 
Source: TURKSTAT. 
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Until recently, five years of elementary school had been the only compulsory education in 
Turkey. In 1996, mandatory education increased to 8 years, and in 2004 to 12 years. In this 
respect, there has been considerable progress on the educational front, with significant increases 
in enrolment rates. The enrolment rate for the 5-14 age group reached 82% in 2003. Lower 
enrolment rates in the eastern regions are a consequence of the low level of participation by 
girls. The increases in mandatory schooling and better enforcement, accompanied by civil 
projects, are effective at improving the situation. 
For many years, Turkey was unable to provide the necessary infrastructure to serve the high 
school-age population. Class sizes were typically above the average in Europe and other 
developed countries. Turkey’s public spending on education grew significantly after 1998, in 
both real terms and as a percentage of GDP. Nevertheless, Turkey’s public spending on 
education relative to GDP was still slightly lower than (but comparable to) that of lower-
middle-income countries. Total spending on education increased from 2.35% of GDP in 1995 to 
3.82% in 2002 (TUSIAD, 2006). A recent development in the education sector is increased 
private-sector spending. The estimated share of private spending was over 10% in 2002. 
The share of the youngest group (aged less than 15) in the population is declining (see also 
section 3.1 on population). As a result, Turkey will be able to divert resources from primary 
education to secondary and tertiary education in the future. 
Turkey also faces qualitative problems in education. Turkey participated in the PISA study 
conducted by the OECD. Turkish students’ performance was one of the worst in the sample. 
More than half of the students performed unsatisfactorily in the analytical and mathematical 
section of the test. One interesting result of the PISA study was that the variation of results 
among Turkish students was one of the highest of all participating countries. This finding 
implies marked inequalities in the Turkish education system.
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3. Demography 
3.1  Trends in the population structure and fertility 
Turkey experienced high rates of population growth in the last century. The total population of 
Turkey was 40.3 million in 1975, 67.8 million in 2000 and was estimated at 71.8 million in 
2004. Turkey is expected to reach a steady state of population at around 95 million in three to 
four decades.  
The Turkish population is relatively young. The share of the working-age population (aged 15-
64) is at its peak at around 67%. The share has been at this level for about two decades and will 
stay roughly there for another two before it declines. As noted earlier, this presents Turkey with 
a particular opportunity to build up its socio-economic infrastructure. Tables 5 and 6 show 
population growth rates and shares for the various age groups. Current trends imply that the 
shares held by different age groups in the population will change substantially in the next few 
decades and that the population is ageing. 
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Table 5. Population growth (annualised rates in %) 
  Total  Younger than 15  15-64  65+  Younger than 25  25-64 
1975–80 0.34  -1.39  0.72  1.67  -0.29  0.49 
1980–85 0.22  -1.77  1.00  -0.26  -0.69  1.06 
1985–90 0.29  -1.13  0.41  1.79  -1.08  0.87 
1990–95 0.42  -0.34  0.36  1.63  -1.04  1.02 
1995–2000 0.27  -0.62 0.24  1.41  -0.91 0.63 
2000–05 0.21  -0.47  0.12  1.32  -0.48  0.26 
2005–10 0.17  -0.59  0.08  1.23  -0.52  0.20 
Sources: General population censuses; figures for 2005 and 2010 are Eurostat projections. 
Table 6. Demographic structure of population (% share in total) 
   0-14 15-64  65+ 
1975 40.47  54.74  4.59 
1980 38.97  55.93  4.72 
1985 37.52  58.09  4.20 
1990 34.96  60.68  4.28 
2000 29.82  64.45  5.69 
2005 28.44  65.66  5.90 
2010 26.56  67.17  6.27 
Source: General population censuses. Figures for 2005 and 2010 are TUIK projections. 
Both population growth and fertility rates are higher in the less developed and less educated 
eastern and south-eastern regions. Tables 7 and 8 show the regional differences in 1975 and 
2000. Despite declining fertility rates and the ageing of society in all the regions, the differences 
in the structure of the population across regions have been quite persistent in the last quarter of a 
century. Although there was some decline during the period from 1975 to 2000, it should be 
noted that approximately two-thirds of the population in the less developed south-eastern region 
was younger than 25.
7 
Table 7. Regional population differentials in 1975 (in %) 
  Share in total 
population 
Share within region
 
   0-15  15-24  25-54  55-64    65+ 
Istanbul 9.68  32.88  21.65  37.12  4.77  3.58 
Western Marmara  5.17  33.19  20.80  33.56  5.69  6.76 
Aegean 13.38  35.22  19.45  34.00  5.48  5.85 
Eastern Marmara  7.43  35.48  19.38  34.07  5.37  5.70 
West Anatolia  9.93  38.88  20.86  32.19  4.29  3.78 
Mediterranean 11.29  42.69  19.78  29.30  4.02  4.21 
Central Anatolia  7.10  45.75  17.75  27.77  4.62  4.12 
Western Black Sea  10.37  41.50  17.45  30.69  5.16  5.19 
Eastern Black Sea  6.70  44.15  18.59  27.19  4.41  5.65 
North-east Anatolia  5.13  46.55  19.10  27.24  3.71  3.40 
Central east Anatolia  5.86  48.58  18.71  25.72  3.42  3.56 
South-east Anatolia  7.96  48.77  18.23  26.32  3.49  3.19 
Source: TURKSTAT. 
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Table 8. Regional population differentials in 2000 (in %) 
  Share in total 
population 
Share within region 
    0-15 15-24 25-54 55-64  65+ 
Istanbul 14.78  26.34  20.99  43.04  4.97  4.66 
Western Marmara  4.27  21.94  18.88  42.13  8.02  9.03 
Aegean 13.18  25.14  19.23  41.48  6.97  7.18 
Eastern Marmara  8.47  25.60  19.80  41.61  6.50  6.49 
West Anatolia  9.50  27.65  21.07  40.47  5.55  5.26 
Mediterranean 12.84  30.55  20.30  38.83  5.35  4.97 
Central Anatolia  6.18  31.28  20.74  36.24  5.88  5.86 
Western Black Sea  7.22  28.41  19.03  37.41  7.31  7.84 
Eastern Black Sea  4.62  28.42  19.80  37.16  6.91  7.72 
North-east Anatolia  3.70  36.62  22.60  30.86  5.05  4.87 
Central east Anatolia  5.50  39.22  22.60  30.16  4.15  3.87 
South-east Anatolia  9.75  42.72  21.85  28.67  3.59  3.16 
Source: TURKSTAT. 
Table 9 shows some projections on certain demographic variables by TURKSTAT. Life 
expectancy is currently at 70 and is expected to increase to 73.5 in the next 20 years. The crude 
mortality rate will also increase slightly because of population ageing.  
The infant mortality rate is still high in Turkey (24 per 1,000). In the poorer eastern regions, this 
figure is 55 per 1,000 – more than twice the country average. This is a priority area for the state 
and civil society, with the goal of halving this number in the next 20 years. 
Table 9. Life expectancy at birth (years) 
 2000  2005  2010  2020 
Total 70.4  71.3  72.0  73.5 
Men 68.1  68.9  69.6  71.0 
Women 72.8  73.8  74.5  76.1 
Crude mortality rate (‰)   6.2  6.2  6.5  7.0 
Infant mortality rate (‰)   28.9  23.6  20.0  14.7 
Source: TURKSTAT. 
3.2 Ethnic  origins 
There are no official statistics on the ethnic composition of the population. There are two 
alternative measurements of population estimates for ethnic groups in the country. One is based 
on the interpolation of census data on mother tongue, which was last collected back in 1965. 
The other is obtained by survey research drawn from several questions related to ethnic origin 
with respect to languages spoken at the time of the survey as well as during respondents’ 
childhoods.  
3.2.1  Mother tongue in census data  
Servet Mutlu (1996) provides a detailed analysis of the 1965 census data and extrapolates the 
Kurdish population data in the Turkish provinces for 1990. His analyses for the Kurdish 
population unfortunately are not generated for other ethnic groups. In order to set a reference 
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all other non-Turkish ethnicities remained at their 1965 shares and only the Turkish and Kurdish 
shares changed from 1965 to 1990. This is obviously an unrealistic assumption as Mutlu also 
notes that the rising Kurdish share is primarily attributable to a higher-than-average population 
rise for the Kurdish group. So, as the Kurdish group increased the other groups also increased 
but at a lower rate; thus, their shares should have declined as a result. We assumed that other 
non-Turkish and non-Kurdish groups declined by 10% compared with their 1965 shares and we 
took the Turkish group as the residual of the rest. As a result, we see that less than 15% of the 
population is of non-Turkish ethnic origin as defined by mother tongue. Most likely, the 
situation is such that besides the Kurdish and Arabic group no other ethnicity constitutes more 
than 1% of the total population. Since the Arabic group forms about 1%, the largest group by far 
is made up of Kurds, representing about 12-13% of the population.  
Table 10. Ethnic structure of the population (as a % of total population) 
 1965  1990 
 Number  %  Number  %*  %** 
Turkish 28,289,680  90.1  –  85.1  85.4 
Arabic 365,340  1.2  –  1.2  1.08 
Circassian 58,339  0.2  –  0.2  0.18 
Kurdish 2,370,233  7.6  7,046,250  12.5  12.5 
Lazgi 26,007  0.1  –  0.1  0.09 
Other 28,822  0.9  –  0.9  0.81 
Total 31,391,421  100.0  56,475,000  100.0  100.0 
* Mutlu’s estimate for the Kurdish population is taken and all other non-Turkish ethnic origins are assumed to have 
remained at their 1965 shares. Turkish ethnicity is taken to be the residual of the other ethnic groups. 
** Mutlu’s estimate for the Kurdish population is taken and all other non-Turkish ethnic origins are assumed to have 
lost 10% of their 1965 shares. Turkish ethnicity is taken to be the residual of the other ethnic groups. 
Source: Mutlu (1996). 
It is clearly very important to determine where the Kurdish group resides in the country. The 
Arabic group is concentrated in a few border provinces in the south-eastern Anatolia region. 
Yet, because of internal migration, the Kurdish population may be dispersed across a number of 
other regions. Mutlu (1996) offers estimates of the Kurdish population by province, thus giving 
a regional depiction. Table 11 shows that in 1990 the Kurdish population primarily resided in 
the eastern and south-eastern Anatolia regions, which were home to about 65% of the total 
Kurdish group. Only about 25% of the total Kurdish population could be found in the 
migration-attracting Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean regions. In each of these latter 
regions, less than 9% of the regional population was of Kurdish origin. The share of Kurds in 
the regional populations of central Anatolia and the Black Sea region was also less than 9%, 
with Kurds representing less than 6% in central Anatolia and less than 1% in the Black Sea 
region.  
One deficiency of these data is that they do not reflect the problematic 1990s, during which 
ethnic conflict pushed many thousands out of their villages and into the cities. This period also 
saw thousands of refugees of Kurdish origin flee to Turkey after the first Gulf War. Both of 
these developments will have altered the number of persons of Kurdish origin in Turkey but the 
picture in terms of population shares is more likely to have remained more or less the same.  
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Table 11. Estimated Kurdish population by region 
 1965  1990 
Region  Number 
(in thousands) 
% of Total 
population 
Number 
(in thousands) 
% of Total 
regional 
population 
% of Total 
Kurdish 
population 
Marmara  72.65 1.24  810.13 6.09 11.5 
Aegean  15.77 0.36  296.99 3.93  4.2 
Mediterranean  190.22 4.98  726.55 8.95 10.3 
Central  Anatolia 262.64 4.13  579.38 5.53  8.2 
Black  Sea  28.72 0.51  37.88 0.50  0.5 
Eastern  1,369.65 38.87  2,230.29 41.96  31.7 
South-eastern  1,192.73 64.24  2,365.04 64.98  33.6 
Country  total  3,132.38  9.98  7,046.26 12.60 100.0 
Source: Mutlu (1996). 
We have unreliable data on these forced migrations and do not especially know the extent to 
which they were directed towards regions other than the east and south-east. In all likelihood 
Mutlu’s (1996) data should be read as a baseline. Further migrations of the Kurdish population 
to the cities have altered the ethnic population shares in the rural and urban settlements. While 
some provinces have lost their Kurdish-origin populations, others have gained ethnic Kurdish 
populations, most intensively in their shantytown neighbourhoods. These developments may 
have pushed the share of the Kurdish ethnic group above the baseline estimates of Mutlu for 
1990. Realistically, however, we should not expect to find most of the Kurdish segment outside 
the eastern and south-eastern regions. So, the overall picture depicted in Mutlu (1996) will 
probably have not altered significantly over the last decade. 
3.2.2  Mother tongue in survey data 
The most recent academic survey available to us is the one on social preferences in Turkey by 
Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu (2006), from which data on ethnic background on the basis of 
languages spoken can be obtained for the voting-age population (Table 12). The first question 
was posed in an open-ended format as to the languages spoken with parents during the 
respondent’s childhood. To this question, about 10% reported that they spoke Kurdish or Zaza 
at home during their childhood. A considerably larger group of respondents reported that they 
are currently speaking Kurdish, Zaza or Kırmanc (14.5%). Obviously, while a number of 
persons tend to forget their mother-tongue Kurdish, considerably more individuals learn 
Kurdish dialects after childhood. When we join these two findings, 15% either spoke Kurdish 
during their childhood or are currently speaking Kurdish. We clearly do not know how well 
these individuals can speak Kurdish. Although this survey evidence is patently an overestimate 
of the number of persons of Kurdish ethnic origin, it nonetheless comes close to Mutlu’s (1996) 
estimate based on census data. In summary, it is safe to argue that the share of the population of 
Kurdish ethnic origin in Turkey is between 13% and 15% – most likely not less but not more 
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Table 12. Languages spoken (in %) 
Languages spoken at home with parents 
Turkish 87.9 
Kurdish 9.0 
Zaza 0.9 
Arabic 0.8 
Other 1.4 
Total 100.0 
Languages presently spoken 
Kurdish/Zaza/Kırmanc 14.5 
Kurdish origin 
Either speaks Kurdish or Zaza presently or reports to 
have spoken these with their parents during childhood 
15.0 
Source: Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu (2006). 
3.3 Migration 
Turkey has been undergoing a rapid process of urbanisation since the mid-20
th century. The 
pace has accelerated in the last three decades. In 2000, the rural population constituted one-third 
of the population, down from 58% in 1975. The move to cities also reduced household size 
from 5.8 in 1975 to 4.5 in 2000. As the share of agriculture continues to shrink, urbanisation is 
expected to increase and consequently household size will decline further. There are no 
available data on internal migration.
8 
In the last few decades, there have been five main types of emigration of Turkish citizens: 
family reunion and family formation, asylum-seeking, irregular emigration, contract-related 
(low-skill) and professional (high-skilled) emigration. There are no reliable data sources on 
international migration,
9 although the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on 
International Migration (CARIM) compiles data from various national and international sources 
and presents them on its website (www.carim.org). 
There are about 3 million immigrants originating from Turkey in EU countries.
10 Nearly three-
fourths of them are in Germany. Because of strict restrictions on labour mobility, the largest 
migratory flow is currently family-related emigration of Turks to the EU, which amounts to 
50,000 persons (gross) annually. There is some return migration – especially among retired 
Turks – and an increasing trickle of retirees of EU origin settling in Turkey. Hence, net 
migration to the EU is probably half of the gross outflow from Turkey. 
Speculations concerning the probable magnitude of future emigration from Turkey to the EU 
differ widely. Serious estimations put the figure at around 1-2 million in the coming two to three 
decades – even if restrictions on labour mobility are removed (Erzan et al., 2006). 
                                                 
8 Rough computations for internal migration can be made based on the differences between actual 
changes in the population of geographical centres and projections under ‘no-migration’ scenarios. There 
are no generally accepted estimates, however. 
9 There are major shortcomings in data on international migration, such as that reported by the OECD. 
Analysts prefer using changes in the shares of immigrants (reported by the host countries) rather than 
flows. Nevertheless, naturalisation and the newborn children of the immigrants distort these data as well.  
10  This estimate is based on host-country statistics and only to some extent includes naturalised 
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Officially, there are a quarter million migrants from other countries living in Turkey. Two-thirds 
of them are legal immigrants. Turkey is a major transit destination for asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants. During the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1991 Gulf War, hundreds of 
thousands of refugees flooded into Turkey. Turkey is also becoming an important final 
destination. In small sub-segments of the labour market, such as childcare and housework, 
irregular migrants have a growing impact. The number of high-level foreign professionals is 
also rising together with increased FDI flows. 
4.  Living conditions: Key developments and dynamics 
4.1 Income  distribution 
Despite the fact that Turkey has experienced relatively high growth rates in the last few years, 
the per capita income is still very low compared with EU levels. According to 2003 data, the 
mean equivalised (according to Eurostat methodology) disposable income is €5,416, a figure 
well below the EU-25 average of €15,913 (both figures are adjusted according to purchasing 
power parity, PPP). This level of disposable income, coupled with the highly skewed income 
distribution that prevails in the country as reflected in the Gini coefficient (based on income) of 
0.40 in 2004 (compared with the EU-25 average of 0.29) and the S80/S20 ratio of 7.7 in 2004 
(compared with the EU-25 average of 4.6), makes the poverty problem an important one.  
The Gini coefficient based on income has decreased (comparing the values of 0.49 in 1994, 0.44 
in 2002 and 0.40 in 2004). The Gini coefficient based on consumption (total expenditures) has 
shown a slight increase (comparing the values of 0.42 in 1994 with 0.43 in 2002) and the Gini 
coefficient based on the Eurostat scale of per adult equivalent consumption has remained the 
same over the period 1994–2002 (at 0.38). The 1994 financial crisis might be behind this 
declining income inequality and increasing consumption inequality (Duygan & Guner, 2006; 
see also Gursel et al., 2000). 
Although it is true that the percentages of the population under the food poverty line
11 and with 
less than $2.15 per capita per day are very close to zero (1.29% and 2.49% in 2004, 
respectively), the risk-of-poverty rate
12 has escalated to as high as 25.6% (in 2003). The 
geographical unevenness of income distribution makes the picture more disturbing. Roughly 
speaking, the average per capita income in the eastern regions is less than half that of the 
western regions. Life expectancy for the west of the country is around the European average at 
72 years, whereas it falls to around 60 years for the south-eastern region. The literacy rate is 
above 90% in the west and around 65% in the south-east. Moreover, there are persistent 
inequalities in access to health services across the different regions. For instance, the number of 
nurses and doctors per 10,000 persons varies greatly among regions. The south-eastern parts of 
the country and rural areas in general have fewer nurses and doctors per unit of population: 
there are only 6 nurses and 6 doctors per 10,000 persons in south-eastern Anatolia whereas in 
western Anatolia these figures are as high as 16.5 and 22, respectively (the national averages are 
11.6 and 13.8, respectively). The percentages of health centres without doctors, of village health 
centres without midwives and of births unattended by health staff, are as high as 20%, 90% and 
20%, respectively, in the eastern and south-eastern regions (the national averages are 13%, 75% 
                                                 
11 This index has been developed by using the actual quantities of the most popular 80 products consumed 
by the 3
rd and 4
th deciles of the population, priced according to the average survey prices for the country. 
This index has recently been updated by the World Bank. 
12 This rate corresponds to the share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-
poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social 
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and 6%). Similarly, infant and child mortality rates show a high level of variance across the 
country: they are substantially below the average figures in urban areas and in western parts, 
whereas they are almost 40% above the averages in rural areas and in the eastern and south-
eastern parts of the country (TURKSTAT & World Bank, 2005, pp. 72–74).  
In fact, owing to the existence of a high degree of informality as well as unemployment in the 
country, the health system – based on a formal employment requirement – is leaves many 
citizens without any health coverage. The ‘green card’ scheme, aimed at offering coverage to 
the poorest cohort, only partially deals with inequalities in access to health care. Still, a 
significant number of citizens (some put the figure as high as 30% of the total population) are 
left to their own devices with respect to accessing health services (Adaman, 2003).  
Table 13, reproduced from the UNDP’s Human Development Report on Turkey (2004, pp. 64–
67) provides detailed information by comparing the top three cities with the lowest six ones in 
terms of human and gender-related development (see also World Bank, 2001; Yalman et al., 
2004 and UNDP, 2005).  
Table 13. Cities in terms of human and gender-related development 
  Highest human development  Lowest human development 
Human development index  Kocaeli Yalova Istanbul Bingol Bitlis Mus Agri  Sirnak
Life expectancy at birth 
(years)  
73.8 72.4 72.4 59.5 59.9 62 60.4  57.7
Adult literacy rate 
(% among age 15 and 
older)  
91.8 92.9 93.2 72.4 71.8 67.3 67.4  62.3
Combined 1
st, 2
nd gross 
enrolment ratio (%)  
99.2 100.3 100.3 65.5 53.1 58.3 57.6  70.6
GDP per capita 
(PPP US$) 
16,536 10,209 9,664 2,331 1,932 1,587 1,803  1,816
Life expectancy index  0.813 0.789 0.791 0.575 0.581 0.617  0.591  0.545
Education index  0.942 0.954 0.956 0.701 0.656 0.643  0.642  0.651
GDP index  0.853 0.772 0.763 0.526 0.494 0.461  0.483  0.484
HDI value  0.869 0.838 0.837 0.601 0.577 0.574  0.572  0.560
GDP per capita (PPP US$) 
rank minus HDI rank 
0 1 1 -1 0 2 0 -2
Gender-related 
development index 
Kocaeli Yalova Istanbul Bingol Bitlis Mus Agri  Sirnak
GDI rank  1 2 3 76 78 80  79  81
GDI value  0.839 0.812 0.810 0.593 0.568 0.556  0.558  0.543
Life expectancy at birth, 
women (years)  
75.7 74.2 74.2 60.5 61.1 63.2 61.3  58.9
Life expectancy at birth, 
men (years)  
70.2 69.0 69.0 56.8 57 59.1 57.8  55
Adult literacy rate, women 
(% aged 15 and older)  
85.9 87.9 88.7 57 55 48.3 48.4  35.8
Adult literacy rate, men 
(% aged 15 and older)  
97.2 97.3 97.7 87.1 86.9 85.5 85.7  82.6
Combined 1
st, 2
nd gross 
enrolment ratio, women 
(%) 
94.6 96.9 98.9 52.7 40.6 44.8 43.8  55.2
Combined 1
st, 2
nd gross 
enrolment ratio, men (%) 
103.6 103.5 101.6 77 63.8 70.1 70.2  84.6BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON TURKEY | 19 
 
Estimated earned income, 
women (PPP US$)  
14,594 9,068 10,304 1,873 1,854 1,369 1,626  1,580
Estimated earned income, 
men (PPP US$)  
18,339 11,236 9,044 2,757 2,002 1,787 1,968  2,012
HDI rank minus GDI rank  0 0 0 1 0 -1  1  0
Source: UNDP (2004). 
Regional developmental disparities remain an important problem in the country, with 
geographical poverty continually a key item on the agenda of the Kurdish separatist movements.  
Four interrelated factors are claimed to be behind the skewed income distribution and its 
inevitable result of high levels of poverty. 
1)  The existence of the informal sector has two implications in this regard: i) it makes tax 
collection through earnings very difficult (as discussed in more detail below), and ii) it 
mostly uses low-skilled workers who are unable to insure themselves. There are rough 
estimates that the informal sector controls 30% of total production (Ozar, 1996; Carkoglu 
& Eder, 2004; Zenginobuz, 2005). Furthermore, significant portions of the population 
who are employed in the informal sector are still unable to distance themselves from the 
poverty line – becoming a sort of ‘working poor’. It is notable that the risk-of-poverty rate 
among those employed is 23% (three times higher than the EU-25 average), which is not 
much different from the overall average rate in Turkey. The corollary to this is that 
working in the informal sector is not enough for the economic wellbeing of the individual, 
as informality in most cases comes to mean irregular jobs and irregular income (either the 
employer does not pay regularly or it is necessary to change jobs often). 
2)  The high rates of unemployment and low rates of labour force participation are indicators 
of the lack of earning for a large number of people, most of whom are poorly educated. 
The economic growth that the country has enjoyed in recent years has so far had a small 
effect on employment. More alarming, there are only a few structural interventions with a 
long-term view for dealing with the unemployment problem. To that one should also add 
the concern that the lack of employment opportunities may worsen with the flow towards 
the cities of an expected excess supply of labour from the shrinking agricultural sector 
(which currently employs about one-third of the total labour force, creating a value added 
of one-sixth (Izmen et al., 2005)). Recalling that those living in rural areas are on the 
average less educated than their urban counterparts are, the future migration waves are to 
bring about thousands of potential job seekers with very low levels of human capital. One 
should also acknowledge the fact that the forced migration that the country experienced in 
the 1990s,
13 stemming from armed conflicts between Kurdish insurgents and the military, 
exacerbated the poverty problem especially in metropolitan cities. The low levels of 
human capital in metropolitan cities, together with the absence of social safety nets, made 
thousands of internally-displaced persons vulnerable to extreme poverty and social 
exclusion. 
3)  The tax system in the country relies heavily on indirect mechanisms, which aggravate the 
distribution and poverty problems, as indirect taxes are generally speaking less 
redistributive than direct ones (Zenginobuz, 2005). The reliance on indirect mechanisms 
is mainly rooted in the presence of the large informal economy – which results in a 
relatively low direct tax base and thus the government finds no other solution than to 
collect the bulk of its revenues through consumption channels. The government, seeking 
to increase the share of direct taxes, has imposed high direct tax rates, but this step has 
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made citizens more inclined to use informal means. Furthermore, the high debt burden of 
the country necessitates that a significant portion of the tax revenue is spent on repaying 
the debt. 
4)  Social programmes are underfunded, given the high prevalence of poverty. In addition, 
the social assistance system seems to suffer from administrative and organisational 
problems. On the one hand, the system in general is too scattered, thus making an overall 
efficiency–effectiveness assessment almost impossible; on the other hand, the system 
lacks transparency and accountability and the fear is that local patronage networks may 
well play a role in the distribution of help. Moreover, as some of the transfers are based 
on formal employment, a significant number of people are unable to benefit fully from 
social programmes.
14 The risk-of-poverty rates before and after transfers – a clear 
indication of the effects of social transfers on the redistribution of income – are the lowest 
when compared with the EU-25. The risk-of-poverty rates before and after transfer 
incomes (excluding pensions and survivors’ benefits) are respectively 25% and 16% in 
the EU-25 and 30% and 26% in Turkey. Also, as a series of household surveys have 
captured, Turkey’s education, health and pension schemes currently provide low quality 
and inadequate services except to the privileged few at the top of the income and status 
scale who can obtain private services. There are also signs of the decreasing power of the 
family and other social networks that have traditionally compensated at least partly for the 
lack of social security (Bugra & Keyder, 2003). Anecdotal observations are persuasive 
that, although they have increased in the last few years, the contributions of local 
governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (including religious 
organisations) in assisting the poor have not amounted to significant levels either. 
The consequences of the skewed income distribution, widespread poverty as well as 
serious regional disparities are multi-dimensional and some seem to be self-perpetuating. 
5)  Despite the important positive actions that have been undertaken in the last few years, 
grave problems persist regarding the treatment of the Kurds (who are not treated as a 
minority owing to the fact that the 1923 Lausanne Treaty reserved the status of minority 
only to religious groups (other than Islam)). Most of the difficulties relate in a direct or 
indirect way to the socio-economic conditions of the Kurdish population. The eastern and 
especially the south-eastern parts of Turkey are largely populated by the Kurds and the 
fact that there are severe developmental disparities between these regions and the rest of 
Turkey is seen as one of the main motives behind the Kurds’ demands for more effective 
regional policy. Therefore, there is a pressing need to create opportunities to actively 
involve the Kurds in these less developed parts of Turkey in the economic and social 
development of their region. 
6)  Although the fertility rate in Turkey in general is decreasing over time, the average 
household size is still above four persons. The chief reason behind this is that most poor 
parents who have no social security coverage perceive a larger family size as the main 
method of achieving security for themselves and their children. This perception, in return, 
brings about a relatively high population increase and an excess labour supply when 
compared with Europe. The poverty rate is positively related to household size: the 
poverty rate of 1-2 person households is 14.5% and of 3-4 person households is 13.7%, 
whereas it climbs to 51% for households of 7 or more persons. This is a clear indication 
of a vicious-circle in having more children and falling into the poverty trap. Furthermore, 
                                                 
14 Although according to official figures the coverage rate is quite high, it is very likely that these figures 
are upwardly biased because of double counting – as otherwise the high prevalence rate of informality 
and the high number of green cards (relating to social assistance for the poor, enabling them to benefit 
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one should also add the existence of cultural/religious barriers in effectively implementing 
birth control policy – a not insignificant number of people, mostly living in poor and rural 
areas, refrain from using birth control. 
7)  Poverty brings about a set of problems in accessing the most basic levels of services in the 
areas of health, education and housing. The main consequence is that the younger 
generations of poor families cannot obtain the kind of education they would like. On the 
one hand, parents sometimes find education costs unbearable: while public education up 
to university level is free of charge, transport to and from school may be costly; also, the 
directors of underfunded schools approach parents to help with financing the most basic 
needs of schools (such as fuel for heating). On the other hand, poverty may require that 
parents withdraw their children from schools and instead send them to work in order to 
contribute to the household income (TURKSTAT & World Bank, 2005). Because of the 
paucity of social assistance in general (for the elderly, the very young and the disabled), 
older children may be forced to stop school to look after those members of the family in 
need. Poor housing conditions and lack of library facilities are additional factors that 
prevent poor children from receiving a better education. This situation in turn brings 
about low human capital, which is one the underlying reasons for persistent poverty. The 
risk-of-poverty rate decreases as the level of education rises. The risk of poverty for 
person aged 6 and older by education level is 45.1% for the illiterate, 33.7% for the 
literate with no diploma, 8.3% for secondary school graduates and 1.3% for university 
graduates.  
In addition, according to the 1999 Child Labour Survey (the latest available) conducted 
by TURKSTAT, 4.2% of children in the 6-14 age group and 28% of those in the 14-17 
age group are employed (either on a part-time or full-time basis). The bulk of these 
children are from families who live in the slum (gecekondu) areas of metropolitan cities 
(Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Ankara and Diyarbakir being the most obvious ones). 
The fear is that these figures may well be underestimated given that many children are 
employed as unpaid family labour in small, family-run ateliers, while many others are 
used as seasonal labour in the agricultural sector. Overall, working children not only lose 
their opportunity to obtain an education, but they are also menaced by risks to their 
physical security (drug addiction, criminality, etc.), which is especially the case for those 
working on the street, as discussed below. 
8)  A relatively recent application of the ‘conditional income transfer’ programme for 
students should be noted. These transfers were first adopted under the Social Risk 
Mitigation Project (funded by the World Bank), which was implemented in 2001. Under 
this programme, steps are taken towards the economic support of families who cannot 
send their children to school or must withdraw them from school. It also provides for 
regular health checks for their children at pre-school age and for pregnant women who, 
owing to poverty, cannot obtain regular health checks during their pregnancy or deliver 
their babies in a health institution. Initial assessments indicate the successes of these 
initiatives, yet the programme is still run by the World Bank. 
9)  The persistent poverty rate, the inappropriateness of the social security system, the low 
quality of public education as well as other social exclusion factors are all behind the 
ever-increasing problem of street children (especially in metropolitan cities) and child 
crime rates (see, for example Aksit et al., 2001, concerning children living and/or working 
on the streets). 
10)  Shanty towns in and around metropolitan cities are both the cause and the result of 
poverty. The bulk of the inhabitants are employed in the informal sector and therefore the 
overwhelming majority in these areas simply does not have any kind of social security or 
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marked difference in Istanbul in the treatment of immigrants who illegally occupy state-
owned lands. Whereas in the past they were eventually given semi-official documents, 
which amounted to the legalisation of their land-holding status, they have recently met 
stricter legal enforcement and growing societal admonition. Keyder analyses this 
recasting of urban order in Istanbul as an inevitable consequence of Turkey’s continued 
integration into global capitalism. The concomitant transformation in Istanbul’s economic 
character has limited the hitherto unlimited opportunities the city presented to newly 
arriving, unskilled migrant labour.  
11)  Poverty, coupled with insufficient social services, especially affects the following 
subgroups: a) the elderly, b) the disabled and c) single parents. As a result, a significant 
portion of the country suffers from poverty, and the current level and quality of social 
services can only partly answer the needs of these population segments. Although local 
government and civil initiatives make important cash or in-kind contributions and there 
seems to be increased concern about poverty-related problems over the last few years at 
governmental levels, without long-term structural intervention, poverty cannot be dealt 
with appropriately. 
4.2  Access to goods and services 
As is well known, living conditions are not only determined by a household’s income position 
but also depend on the development of infrastructure, which may restrict the poor from 
accessing many goods and services. Therefore, this section puts emphasis on some ‘material’ 
living standards – in terms of connection to basic infrastructure (electricity, gas, water and 
sewerage), access to basic services (food stores and pharmacies) and telecommunications 
penetration (telephone and the Internet). The 2002 Household Budget Survey (TURKSTAT, 
2002) collected some information on these aspects of poverty and the information given below 
is mainly based on this survey. 
As far as housing-related indicators are concerned, electricity is virtually universal in Turkey, 
since only 0.1% of the sample population reported that they lived without it (TURKSTAT, 
2002). Yet, around 5% of households still lack access to a piped water system, which may be 
regarded as indicative of a low standard of living. Here, rural areas need specific consideration. 
For instance, according to the 2000 population census, while 98% of households in provincial 
centres and 93% of households in district centres live in housing units with piped water, 27 out 
of 100 households do not have piped water in their housing units in the villages. 
It is also important to note that in Turkey only 9% of households report that they are connected 
to a gas pipe (an urban attribute) and only 7% indicate that they have central heating 
(TURKSTAT, 2002). In this context, 86% of the population in Turkey seems to have stoves as 
their heating source. Data concerning the centralised collection of garbage, the distance to a 
county administrative centre and the percentage of settlements without a pharmacy or food store 
need still to be collected. 
In relation to school availability, the 2001 Household Consumption and Income Survey data 
revealed that 88% of households have a primary school in their residential area. In fact, it is 
possible to argue that primary school availability does not vary much by wealth, and if anything, 
the distribution of primary school availability is pro-poor (about 91% of the least wealthy 
households report the availability of a primary school compared with about 85% of the 
wealthiest households. This trend is primarily driven by urban versus rural residence: 87% of 
urban households reveal primary school availability in their neighbourhoods, while in rural 
areas this percentage increases to 95%. These statistics suggest that the school availability issue 
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(2005) study indicates that in urban areas, even if a primary school were not available in the 
immediate residential area, there would be one in an adjacent neighbourhood. For small rural 
villages, on the other hand, access to schooling is through government-subsidised transportation 
of children to nearby villages or towns. The mean distance to a primary school is higher in rural 
areas and for the poor, but the differences are not large. That being stated, long distances might 
sometimes be more significant in rural areas because of physical barriers such as streams, hills 
and poor road conditions. 
On the telecommunications penetration front, more specifically telephone and Internet 
connections, more than two-thirds (86%) report owning a home telephone. Nevertheless, in 
Turkey, the percentage of houses with Internet access and Internet usage in general is still very 
low compared with the EU-15. Indicators that are more detailed also suggest a significant 
gender differential in Internet usage in the country. 
4.3 Work/life  balance 
The European Quality of Life Survey (Eurofound, 2003) indicates that citizens of Turkey have 
much more difficulty in reconciling work and family life than the populations of the EU-25. 
Around one-third of workers in Turkey report that they have difficulties doing their household 
jobs as well as fulfilling family responsibilities. Moreover, Turkish employees report high 
degrees of social disturbance owing to demanding working conditions as well. Not surprisingly, 
women report problems reconciling work and family life much more often than do their 
counterparts in the EU-15 (the difference between men and women is above 5%), since they 
spend more time on domestic work and family tasks than men do (Eurofound, 2003). 
At this point, the number of working hours and the extent of family responsibilities are worth 
highlighting as the most important factors influencing work/life balance. The World Bank 
(2006) reveals that working hours in Turkey are the highest of any country for which data are 
available. The figures from the Eurobarometer Survey (2002) also show that the ratio of 
employed persons working over 48 hours a week (as high as 45%) is highest in Turkey among 
all European countries.  
Tunali (2003), by using data from the Household Labour Force Survey, reports that overall 
average weekly hours of work in Turkey went up from 48.8 in 1988 to 52.1 hours in 2001. The 
corresponding figures are 50.1 to 53.7 hours for working men and 41.2 to 44.7 hours for 
working women. In fact, the social-security payment calculations, which are based on the 
number of days worked rather than the number of hours, might give firms an incentive to use 
existing workers in overtime rather than hire new workers. Firms also find it more advantageous 
to use existing workers even by paying higher overtime rates rather than hire new ones given 
the severance requirements and favourable tax treatment of overtime work.
15 
Actual hours of work per week vary considerably when broken down by worker status (regular 
wage and salary workers, casual wage and salary workers, employers, self-employed and unpaid 
family workers). Casual workers, who do not have employment protection in general, work 
longer hours than do regular wage and salary workers throughout the period under examination. 
The Economic Research Forum & Institut de la Méditerranée (2005) also reports that the 
analysis of actual hours worked shows significant differences among sectors, with longer 
working hours in industry and services. Excessively long working hours in services are partly 
explained by the high level of self-employment in this sector. 
                                                 
15 Turkey has the highest hours of work in manufacturing per week, compared with selected EU and 
middle-income countries. In 2004, for instance, it is argued that if workers in Turkish manufacturing had 
worked 45 hours on average instead of 52, another 500,000 workers would have been needed. 24 | ADAMAN, CARKOGLU, ERZAN, FILIZTEKIN, OZKAYNAK, SAYAN & ULGEN 
Concerning gender differences, it should be noted that the lower participation rates of women in 
urban settings reflect social customs, whereby married women are expected to devote 
themselves to child rearing. Interestingly, young, unmarried women with greater financial needs 
and less onerous family responsibilities are three times more likely than married women are to 
be in the labour force (World Bank, 2006; Tunali, 2003). Moreover, an examination of the data 
on hours by marital status reveals that the share of married women decreases sharply as the 
length of the work week increases. Tunali (2003) indicates that the data on hours of work 
suggests that the labour market in Turkey does not offer the flexible working arrangements that 
have been credited for the dramatic rise in the proportion of women in the workforces of OECD 
countries. The overall picture reveals that part-time employment constitutes only a tiny fraction 
of total employment in non-agricultural activities (Eurofound, 2003).  
In addition to perceived problems combining domestic work and family tasks, some workers in 
Turkey note that they have problems in concentrating at work because of family responsibilities. 
Turkey the only country where more than 8% of individuals report difficulties of this kind in the 
Eurofound study (2003).  
4.4  Housing and local environment 
Housing is one of the key dimensions of an individual’s material position and quality of life, 
and housing conditions are closely related to the local environment as well. Local environment 
is defined here in terms of space, access to recreational areas, the levels of pollution and 
surrounding noise, as well as various social menaces such as crime. 
Eurofound (2003) reveals that spatial conditions in Turkey are substantially worse than in the 
EU-15. Those living in Turkey have considerably less privacy than those residing in Western 
Europe. The Eurofound survey additionally revealed that Turkey is among those countries 
where more of the population complain about a shortage of space (33%) and other housing 
problems relating to rot (31%) or damp (31%), which are figures well above the EU-25 averages 
of 18%, 11% and 13%, respectively.  
These findings are not surprising, given that in Turkey there are pronounced differences in the 
kinds of dwellings in which people live. The TURKSTAT & World Bank (2005) report 
indicates that about half the population lives in a house and another 27% lives in apartments. 
While individual houses are primarily in rural areas, they are also still prevalent in urban areas – 
particularly in gecekondu (slum) areas. Apartments are almost exclusively an urban 
phenomenon. The urban poor are clustered in the gecekondu areas and virtually all gecekondu 
dwellings are houses. The lack of an indoor flushing toilet is mostly associated with area of 
residence: while 96% the households in provincial centres live in a housing unit in which there 
is a toilet, this proportion is 87% in district centres and 61% in villages.  
The question of ownership is particularly interesting in light of the development concerning 
gecekondus. According to the 2000 population census, 68% of households own their housing 
units in Turkey and this proportion varies by locality. While the proportion of households that 
own their housing units is 58% in provincial centres and 64% in district centres, this proportion 
increases to 87% in villages. Furthermore, accommodation provided rent-free, which is rare in 
Europe, is relatively more common in Turkey. Strikingly, according to the Household Budget 
Survey in 2002, 81% of households are either owner-occupier or rent-free and hence, the 
proportion of tenants is just 19%. 
In relation to the perceived quality and safety of the neighbourhood and local environment, the 
inhabitants of Turkey complain most about a lack of green space (45%) and water quality 
(41%). There is also more concern about air pollution and noise (29% each) when compared 
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5.  Tax and benefit systems, and policy approaches 
5.1 Institutional  system of social protection 
The social protection system in Turkey consists of the social insurance system, and the social 
services and assistance system. The social insurance system aims at providing insurance to 
society at large, mainly in the form of health care services and pensions, with the principle of 
self-financing, whereas the social assistance seeks to alleviate poverty and provide social care 
for needy persons and groups. With regard to the organisational structure of the social 
protection system, broadly speaking, a functional division can be made between those 
institutions that provide social insurance and those that provide social services and assistance. 
Each is discussed in turn below (drawing from Adaman, 2003). 
The history of legal arrangements to protect workers against various risks in Turkey goes back 
to the 1860s. The first major initiative during the Republican era (from 1923 onwards) was the 
introduction of the legal framework in 1946 for an insurance scheme against income losses 
stemming from employment-related injuries, occupational diseases and maternity. This was 
followed by the creation of three publicly run institutions. The Public Employees’ Pension Fund 
(Emekli Sandigi or ES) was established in 1950 and covers active and retired white-collar 
workers employed by local and central governments or civil servants. Affiliates of the Social 
Insurance Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu or SSK), established in 1964, are blue-collar 
public workers and all those working in private firms. Finally, the Social Insurance Institution 
for the Self-Employed (Bag-Kur, or BK), which was established in 1971, covers the self-
employed, farmers, artisans, the voluntarily insured in agriculture and homemakers. 
Today, protection against income loss owing to invalidity, old age, sickness and disability as 
well as maternity is provided mainly by these three agencies, the SSK, the ES and the Bag-Kur, 
which also provide survivors’ benefits for dependents and coverage for medical care for 
workers and their dependents. Unemployment insurance was introduced in 2002, and the 
provision of coverage is managed by the Employment Agency (Is-Kur). Unemployment 
insurance is a compulsory scheme and mainly covers the wage earners registered with the SSK 
and to a much lesser extent some other types of employees defined by law (Economic Research 
Forum & Institut de la Méditerranée, 2005). Yet, to be able to benefit from unemployment 
insurance, the workers must satisfy strict eligibility conditions, which limit the scope of the 
unemployment insurance.
16 
Health and life insurance plans have long been available through private companies to those 
who want additional coverage but specially designed retirement accounts for funded provision 
of additional pension benefits were not available prior to 2003, except through a number of 
pension funds privately set up by some banks, companies, universities, etc., to provide optional 
coverage for their employees. After the legal and regulatory framework was drawn up to allow 
working individuals to voluntarily purchase additional coverage from private companies, many 
insurance companies began to offer individual retirement plans in 2003, essentially 
transforming the single-pillar pension system in Turkey into a two-pillar system.  
Coverage is compulsory for all wage and salary earners as well as for self-employed individuals 
in principle; official figures show that the current system covers more than 90% of the 
population. Table 14 provides the basic information in this respect.  
                                                 
16  Workers who have paid premiums for at least 600 days in the last three years, including full 
contributions for the last 120 days prior to unemployment, and who have lost their job involuntarily or 
owing to no fault of their own, can benefit from unemployment insurance. 26 | ADAMAN, CARKOGLU, ERZAN, FILIZTEKIN, OZKAYNAK, SAYAN & ULGEN 
Table 14. Statistical data for the contributory system as of the end of 2005 
Social security institutions End  of  2005 
(in thousands) 
End of 2005
(%)
The Pension Fund (ES)  9,284  14
Social Insurance Institution (SSK)  40,829  61
Social Security Organisation of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Other 
Self-Employed (Bag-Kur)  16,036 24
Private funds in total  308  0
General total  66,458  100
The proportion of contributors, pensioners and dependents covered   –  91.2
The ratio of active insured to pensioners   1.81  –
Dependency ratio  3.97  –
Source: Office of the Secretary-General for EU Affairs (2006). 
Yet, as noted by Adaman (2003, p. 32), it is feared that these figures are upwardly biased 
mainly because of double counting. Accordingly, double counting may occur for the following 
two reasons: “(i) the a priori estimation of the dependency ratio might be a realistic one if only 
one individual (the husband or the wife) works, but an unrealistic one if both the husband and 
the wife do work together. (ii) If one [person] insured changes [to another] system (say from 
Bag-Kur to ES) and fails to report this, he or she can be double counted.”  
Therefore, it is possible to argue that actual coverage is far less comprehensive in reality. Low 
compliance with pension laws is a notable factor here. As mentioned in previous sections of this 
report, there is a large number of unregistered workers, partly because of the high rates of taxes 
collected from workers and employees as contributions towards pension coverage. Even for 
registered workers, enforcement problems lower actual contribution receipts significantly below 
potential levels. These problems include the tendency among employers to underreport 
payments to workers or to withhold the contributions collected rather than transferring them to 
pension fund administrations, and there are usually economic incentives for such violations of 
pension laws (such as low late transfer penalties relative to market interest rates) (see also 
section 5.4). 
In addition to benefits provided to workers/self-employed persons and their families in return 
for premium contributions made by actively working individuals, there are social assistance and 
social service programmes providing needs-based, temporary benefits for the poor and the 
needy. These programmes are coordinated by various branches of the central government and 
local governments appointed by the central government or municipalities. At present, the 
following two institutions are considered the main arms of the social assistance scheme 
(Adaman, 2003): 1) the Social Aid and Solidarity Encouragement Fund (Sosyal Yardimlasma 
ve Dayanismayi Tesvik Fonu or SYDTF) and 2) the General Directorate of Social Services and 
Child Protection (Sosyal Hizmetler ve Cocuk Esirgeme Kurumu or SHCEK).  
SYDTF, legally established in May 1986, has a mandate of assisting citizens in absolute poverty 
and need and other persons who have been admitted to or entered Turkey, to ensure a fair 
distribution of income by taking measures for strengthening social justice, and promoting social 
assistance and solidarity. SYDTF is resourced by an extra budgetary fund that is financed by 
earmarked taxes and it works in conjunction with regional Social Aid and Solidarity 
Associations (Sosyal Yardimlasma ve Dayanisma Vakiflari or SYDVs), which are given the 
task of implementation. Overall, resources are allocated at the beginning of each year on a 
regional basis with attention paid to population and socio-economic indicators (Adaman, 2003). 
There are two kinds of benefits: 1) in-kind benefits including food, clothing, fuel, medicine and BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON TURKEY | 27 
 
small productive projects (e.g. greenhouses); and 2) cash benefits in the form of grants and 
scholarship programmes, and emergency and after-disease assistance. 
SYDVs apply individual criteria to define those in need; each SYDV is thus independent in the 
decision-making process in granting social assistance (SYDVs are chaired by governors or 
district governors and the rest of the running committee consists of the mayor, the provincial 
head of finance, the provincial director of social services, a health official and private citizens). 
The most systematic social assistance is through the green card programme, enacted in 1992 
following a protocol between SYDTF and the Ministry of Health, providing free basic health 
care to the needy not covered under any social security scheme. 
SHCEK, on the other hand, is a general directorate with a budget. It is a public legal entity, 
providing services, care and assistance to vulnerable groups, including children, the young, the 
disabled, women, the elderly and families in need of protection.  
In addition to these institutions, the public/private institutions in Table 15 help to provide 
assistance. At the central level, there are bodies such as the Family Research Institution (Aile 
Arastirma Kurumu), the General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women (Kadinin 
Statusu ve Sorunlari Genel Mudurlugu) and the General Directorate of Handicapped Persons 
(Ozurluler Idaresi Baskanligi), the main task of which is to help coordinate various activities in 
their fields.  
At the civic engagement level, Adaman (2003) notes 73,000 associations and 4,000 trusts 
currently active in Turkey. Of the active associations, around 34% can be categorised under the 
headings of social assistance, charity (23%) and culture (29%). The majority of trusts fall under 
the headings of charity (31%) and education (22%). The 8
th Five-year Development Plan points 
out that collaboration among public units, local administrators, and charity establishments and 
NGOs should be ensured since observations draw a rather unsuccessful picture today. Weak 
social assistance schemes result in families searching for protection elsewhere against risk 
situations. In fact, in Turkey, both family institutions and more extended family ties (kinship), 
along with other social networks (neighbourhood, localities, etc.) provide a wide range of social 
support (Bugra, 2001). 
Table 15. Institutions and their activity areas in social assistance 
Institutions/organisations Activity  area 
Ministry of Health  Green card programme providing free health care to the 
needy not covered under any social security scheme 
Public Employees’ Pension Fund (ES)  Educational and material assistance to disabled children, 
payments to the elderly and disabled, etc. 
Ministry of Youth and Sport   Youth centres, camps, sports activities 
Ministry of Justice  Supportive activities for prisoners 
General Directorate for Foundations  Payments to those in need, orphans and disabled persons 
and charitable services 
Municipalities   Fuel, food, clothing, educational needs; nursing homes for 
the elderly; centres for children and the youth; centres for 
the disabled 
Charity organisations and other NGOs 
working on social protection  
Various assistance in cash and kind; nursing homes for the 
elderly; rehabilitation centres; centres and programmes for 
children and youth 
Source: Office of the Secretary-General for EU Affairs (2006). 
After the economic crisis of 2001, as noted in section 4.1, the World Bank also started to take 
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transfer programme to poor families with the conditions that their children attend school and 
have health checks on a regular basis. The project is financed through a World Bank loan, and at 
the time of writing, it is not known whether it is to become permanent. Another social assistance 
mechanism is the newly introduced micro-finance programme in the south-eastern region. 
Again, however, far from being based on the idea that social assistance is a right, this initiative 
is grounded in the liberal view that social protection should be based on productive activity 
(Bugra & Keyder, 2006). 
Overall, the bulk of services provided for social protection are centralised, with local 
governments having a less significant role in the social protection system. The ES is under the 
Ministry of Finance and the SSK and the Bag-Kur are under the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security. Private institutions and NGOs exhibit either a centralised or a decentralised 
organisational structure. With regard to centralised public institutions, one should also note that 
the decisions regarding the ways in which some services are carried out and the eligibility 
conditions set for benefiting from these services can be left to the discretion of local units, 
though in the vast majority of cases, Ankara applies strict rules and regulations (Adaman, 2003).  
In fact, the 2005 European Commission report notes that the government must pursue its 
ongoing efforts towards reforming the social security system, which suffers from a lack of 
financial stability, the presence of a large informal sector and administrative and management 
problems (European Commission, 2005). Differing definitions of persons in need of social 
assistance and services along with poor coordination among the social assistance institutions are 
other key weaknesses of the current system. The fact that social assistance has not been defined 
as a social right results in an inefficient use of scarce resources, leads to weak public 
consciousness and perceptions of assistance as a favour. 
5.2  Recent and planned institutional reforms in social protection 
The social security system in Turkey is going through a major overhaul. A draft reform package 
was prepared by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to restructure the system. The 
legislative process that is near completion primarily has three goals to achieve after the new 
legal framework becomes effective on 1 January 2007. First, the reform seeks to separate fully 
the health and social assistance functions from retirement insurance. The three existing social 
security institutions are to be unified under a single organisation to increase the transparency 
and efficiency of the pension system while also harmonising eligibility conditions and the 
calculation of benefits provided by individual agencies. Second, parametric reform is to be 
introduced to restore actuarial balances and to help curb the rapidly growing deficits of the 
publicly managed social-security system. Finally, a crucial goal of the health reform agenda is 
to improve access to medical care by all segments of society. Each of these reform elements is 
discussed in turn below. Overall, the social security reform envisages establishing a new 
service-focused, citizen-oriented, equal, fair and standardised system and reducing the burden of 
the social security system on the economy. 
Institutional reform. As explained in section 5.1, the traditional social security services in 
Turkey have largely been provided by three different agencies, the SSK, the ES and Bag-Kur, 
each covering different segments of the working population according to different eligibility 
conditions and different rules for the calculation of benefits. This organisationally fractured 
system has created a great deal of inefficiency and introduced wedges between contributions, 
benefits and eligibility conditions across social security agencies, particularly favouring ES 
beneficiaries over the others. The new law intends to remove these differences by centralising 
the institutional structure and by harmonising rules in such a way as to strengthen the links 
between contributions and benefits in social insurance programmes. Efficiency in the provision 
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the Social Security Administration (Sosyal Guvenlik Kurumu, SGK), an umbrella agency for 
coordinating the public provision of all social insurance and social assistance services. Work is 
underway to enable the newly created SGK take over the responsibilities of the SSK, the ES and 
Bag-Kur and dissolve these agencies. An important aspect of this institutional restructuring is 
the separation of the health and other insurance functions traditionally carried out by each 
agency. In other words, under the new organisational structure, specialised departments within 
the SGK will be in charge of the provision health and other social insurance services, including 
those for old age, by a harmonised set of rules, rather than each agency offering all social 
insurance services according to its own rules. Likewise, a separate department within the SGK 
will supervise the provision of social assistance payments made as transfers (i.e. without the 
need for beneficiaries to have contributed prior to the receipt of social assistance). 
Parametric reform. New parameters have been introduced to restore actuarial balances (within 
the old-age insurance operations in particular) to help curb the rapidly growing deficits of the 
publicly managed social-security system. Parametric reform, to become effective after 1 January 
2007, is intended to complement the social security reform act of September 1999 (Law No. 
4447). Law No. 4447 introduced a scheme to raise entitlement ages to 58 for women and 60 for 
men, immediately for new workers and gradually over a 10-year transition period until 2009 for 
existing workers to prevent social security deficits from reaching unmanageable proportions. 
Prior to the enactment of Law No. 4447, the link between a worker’s age and the beginning of 
retirement benefits had been broken, practically allowing women and men to begin collecting 
benefits as early as ages 38-43, after paying contributions for 20 years. Despite some variation 
across social security agencies, the median retirement age was significantly lower than OECD 
averages, visibly contributing to a rapid growth in social security deficits (starting from the 
early 1990s) as low entitlement ages financially squeezed public pension funds by lowering 
both average contributions net of benefits per worker and worker–retiree ratios. Alongside the 
age increase, modifications introduced through Law No. 4447 included the extension of the 
indexation period for the calculation of pension benefits to the entire duration of employment 
and the linking of increases in pension incomes to consumer inflation, to curb the tendency of 
governments to make arbitrary adjustments to pensions received by retirees for political benefit. 
Even then, the effectiveness of this most notable provision of Law No. 4447 was reduced by a 
decision that the Turkish Constitutional Court (the highest court in the country) took in response 
to an appeal by members of the opposition in the parliament. The Constitutional Court ruled in 
February 2001 that the law’s (non-linear) scheme for gradual increases in the entitlement age for 
existing workers during the transition period violated the equality principle and ordered that this 
provision be reconsidered. Consequently, the transition period was extended to 20 years, during 
which entitlement ages will increase roughly by one every year until the ages of 58 and 60 are 
reached by women and men, respectively, by 2021. Furthermore, the replacement rates are 
reduced from 2.6% per year of work to 2.5% immediately and to 2.0% after 2016 to control the 
growth in total old-age benefit payments. As a result of this reform, the ratio of the deficit of the 
pension system to national income is targeted to decline from 4.5% in 2004 to 1% over the long 
term. 
Health care reform. As mentioned earlier, the health system, which was based on a formal 
employment requirement, had left many citizens without any health coverage, partly because of 
the existence of high levels of informality and unemployment in the country. In December 
2003, the Turkish government announced a comprehensive reform programme entitled 
“Transformation in Health”, strengthening the role of Ministry of Health in the provision of 
health care, introducing universal health insurance, restructuring service delivery, and 
developing human resources in the health care industry and a national health information 
system. The related bill has just been approved by parliament. The health care reform, on the 
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starting with the family physician) and, on the other hand, creates a health insurance fund that 
integrates all functions and premium collections related to health within the existing insurance 
agencies of the SSK, the Bag-Kur and the ES. Therefore, at least in principle, all citizens in the 
country shall compulsorily contribute to the health insurance fund and in return shall by covered 
by universal health insurance, with the state making premium contributions on behalf of those 
who are unable to contribute (i.e. those currently under the green card programme).  
Apart from this new framework, there is also a draft proposition prepared by the Turkish 
Employment Agency on the unemployment scheme, relaxing the eligibility conditions and 
increasing unemployment payments. Moreover, establishing a national database covering all of 
the population under the scope of general health insurance and implementing comprehensive 
information systems is expected to enable crosschecks among institutions and to help combat 
unregistered employment. Hence, the resulting improvements in governance and efficiency are 
expected to help improve both the access to medical care by all segments of society and the 
quality of services, which is low given the huge costs. The transfer of hospital networks 
previously run by the SSK and the Bag-Kur to the Ministry of Health has already been 
completed. Yet, this can be viewed as more of an act towards decentralisation, as hospitals will 
now have more autonomy than before. 
These acts should be seen as the first stage of a larger reform to overhaul the system. Additional 
steps in the reform process include the spread of purchased pension schemes managed by the 
private sector as an optional second pillar, further improvement of the information infrastructure 
and records, increased compliance and operational efficiency and attempts to merge different 
coverage rules and regulations under each of the three pension institutions into a unified 
framework (TUSIAD, 2005). It is also important to strengthen coordination and cooperation 
among all public organisations and institutions in the field of social assistance as well as 
universities, local administrations and NGOs. The number of expert staff within social 
assistance and social service institutions is to increase and their institutional capacity should be 
strengthened. The number of the care and social rehabilitation centres, women’s shelters, public 
and family counselling centres and solidarity centres for the elderly should also be increased. 
5.3  Public social expenditure 
In Turkey, while social insurance (including health services), is based on a contributory system, 
social services and social assistance are financed through taxes. The government does not 
contribute to social security premiums, if not acting as an employer, but is responsible for 
paying any deficits. Therefore, the main financing sources of the three social insurance 
institutions (the SSK, the ES and Bag-Kur) consist of premiums paid by their members, the 
state’s contributions and the returns on their investments. Municipalities pay their expenses 
through their budgets, consisting of local taxes, local residents’ voluntary contributions and the 
state’s contributions. Central government institutions (such as SHCEK) are principally financed 
through the central government’s budget, the advertisement revenues of the state television, 
traffic fines, taxes on petroleum and income taxes (Adaman, 2003).  
Social security contributions paid by employees covered by the SSK (excluding unemployment 
insurance premiums) are 14% of gross wages, of which 5% is for health insurance and 9% is for 
retirement benefits. Employers’ contributions to the SSK change with the occupational risk 
premium, and vary between 19.5% and 25% of gross wages. Excluding the risk premium, the 
composition of employers’ contributions is around 6% for health insurance, 11% for pensions 
and 1% for maternity benefits. For the self-employed, the contribution rate is 40% over the 
registered income level (20% for health insurance and 20% for retirement benefits), all paid by 
the insured. For civil servants, contribution rates are 16% and 20% for the insured and the BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON TURKEY | 31 
 
public employer, respectively (see also the Economic Research Forum & Institut de la 
Méditerranée, 2005). 
Over the last few years, social expenditures as a share of GNP has been increasing (as of 2005, 
it was around 19%) and the total shares of education and health expenditures have been 
fluctuating at around 4-5% each (Table 16). 
Table 16. Share of social expenditures in GNP (in %) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Education  4.08 4.61  4.0 4.27 4.48 4.18 4.12 4.17 
Health  2.76 3.28 3.47 4.31 4.77 4.85 5.28 4.97 
Social  Protection 6.13 7.25 6.62 7.79 8.01 9.14 9.14  9.7 
Total    12.97 15.14 14.08 16.37 17.26 18.18 18.54 18.83 
Source: SPO. 
In fact, as can be seen in Table 17, transfers from the government budget to social security 
institutions aimed at financing their deficit have increased steadily since the 1990s; lately, these 
have risen from 3.8% in 1999 to 4.6% in 2005 (Tables 17 and 18, and Figure 1). These transfers 
accounted for approximately 21% of tax revenues and 13.5% of public expenditures (Economic 
Research Forum & Institut de la Méditerranée, 2005).
17 
Table 17. Transfers out of the budget to social security agencies (in million TRY at current 
prices) 
Year SSK  Bag-Kur  ES  Total  Share in central 
government budget 
(%) 
Share in GNP 
(%) 
1999 1,111  796  1,035  2,942  10.5  3.8 
2000 400  1,052  1,775  3,227  6.9  2.6 
2001 1,108 1,740  2,675  5,523  6.9  3.1 
2002 2,386 2,622  4,676  9,684  8.4  3.5 
2003 4,809 4,930  6,145  15,884  11.3  4.5 
2004 5,757 5,273  7,800  18,830  12.4  4.4 
2005* 6,593  6,926  8,889  22,408  14.2  4.6 
* Provisional Source: SSK website (retrieved from http://www.ssk.gov.tr). 
Table 18. Transfers out of the budget to social security agencies (in €1,000 at current prices) 
Years SSK  Bag-Kur ES  Total 
1999 2,480,852.1  1,777,784.0  2,311,144.9  6,569,780.9 
2000 693,589.5  1,823,204.0  3,077,803.4  5,594,596.9 
2001 1,008,226.0  1,583,315.1  2,434,119.5  5,025,660.6 
2002 1,660,796.6  1,825,066.4  3,254,771.5  6,740,634.5 
2003 2,839,572.3  2,911,251.1  3,628,729.9  9,379,553.3 
2004  3,241,170.8 2,968,680.5 4,391,372.6 10,601,224.0 
2005*  3,930,042.5 4,128,541.5 5,298,851.3 13,357,435.4 
* Provisional Source: SSK website (retrieved from http://www.ssk.gov.tr). 
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available as part of the upgrade of the Turkish statistical system (a project that will start at the beginning 
of 2007 and is expected to finish at the end of 2008). Hence, the expected date for Turkey to be included 
in the ESSPROSS system is early 2009. 32 | ADAMAN, CARKOGLU, ERZAN, FILIZTEKIN, OZKAYNAK, SAYAN & ULGEN 
The deficits of the SSK, the ES and the Bag-Kur are the result of a number of factors that have 
exerted negative effects on their revenues and increased their expenditures. The financial 
difficulties of the pension system, for instance, cannot be explained by population ageing 
leading to a decreasing worker–retiree ratio, because Turkey still has a young population. Other 
factors previously noted, such as the low compliance with pension laws by employers and poor 
enforcement of this legislation by authorities as well as the informalisation of economic activity, 
tend to decrease the active–passive ratio. As mentioned in the study by the Economic Research 
Forum & Institut de la Méditerranée (2005), there are also problems with the collection of social 
security contributions and with the management of the funds, putting extra pressure on the 
system. Explanations on the expenditure side emphasise the low entitlement age for pension 
benefits. Projected shares of social security deficits and public health expenditures are provided 
in Figures 2 and 3. 
Figure 1. Transfers out of the budget to social security agencies as a share of GNP 
 
Source: Office of the Secretary General for EU Affairs (2006). 
 
Figure 2. Projected shares of social security deficits to GNP before and after the current reform 
(see section 5.2) 
 
Source: Office of the Secretary General for EU Affairs (2006). BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON TURKEY | 33 
 
Figure 3. Projected shares of public health expenditures to GNP before and after the current 
reform (see section 5.2) 
 
Source: Office of the Secretary General for EU Affairs (2006). 
5.4  Social protection provisions 
To collect old-age pensions and other benefits for health care, sickness, maternity, invalidity, 
occupational injuries and diseases, and survivors through social insurance programmes, 
individuals (or providers in the case of dependents) must be a member of, and hence have 
contributed towards, the insurance institutions – the SSK, the ES and Bag-Kur described above. 
The public insurance system covers members as well as their dependents. A brief outline of the 
benefits is given below (see Adaman, 2003, for a more comprehensive overview). 
•  On the health care front, the system is comprehensive, given that 80% of health-related 
expenses such as consultations, examinations, operations, care, prostheses and drug 
expenses are largely covered by these institutions. The coverage goes up to 90% if 
members are retired. 
•  Sickness cash benefits paid out by the SSK amount to 50% of the average earnings during 
the last four months in the case of hospital treatment and to two-thirds of the average 
earnings in the case of outpatient treatment. 
•  The SSK provides maternity support and this includes health care during pregnancy and at 
birth, breastfeeding support, paid leave for insured women and, if required, sending the 
mother to a more suitable hospital within the country. An insured mother-to-be who has 
paid at least 90 days of maternity premiums or the wife of an insured man who has paid at 
least 120 days of maternity premiums will be eligible for maternity benefits. 
•  The social protection system in the country presently does not incorporate social elements 
such as family or child benefits in general. Only civil servants and workers registered with 
a trade union receive some family payments from a non-contributory system. 
•  A person who has been a member of the SSK, the ES or Bag-Kur for at least five years 
will be eligible for invalidity insurance if s/he suffers from an incurable illness or 
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•  The payment ratio is 60% of the average yearly salary for the SSK and can go up to 70% 
if the person in question is in need of permanent care; the ratios are 65% or 75%, 
respectively, in the case of the Bag-Kur, and 75% in the case of the ES. 
•  Elderly persons receive retirement benefits if they are members of a public insurance 
institution, but there are differences in the retirement pension according to the working 
statute. There are two entitlement conditions for retirement: age and the number of 
premium days. For new workers in the SSK, women should be aged 58 or more and men 
aged 60 or more, and both women and men should have paid at least 5,000 days of 
premiums to be entitled to retirement benefits.  
•  Life insurance coverage is in the form of payments to widows, orphans and parents based 
on the salary of the insured. For all three institutions, there is a requirement of a five-year 
minimum work period. If the insured person dies because of a job-related accident, then 
the minimum work requirement is lifted. Boys are supported until they are 18 years old 
and this age limit goes up to 25 if the individual is enrolled in a university programme; 
girls are supported until they are married. The survivors’ benefit will be halted if children 
start earning money. 
•  If a member of a public insurance institution becomes unable to work for a certain period, 
all the three institutions support the person in question by covering health-related 
expenses. Active civil servants under the coverage of the ES continue to receive their 
salaries and members of the SSK receive a payment based on their past salaries of three 
months. 
In this vein, Tables 19 and 20 set out the types of social insurance currently provided by social 
security institutions and the assistance to be provided after the reform. 
Table 19. Types of social insurance currently provided by social security agencies in Turkey 
under Law Nos. 506, 2925, 1479 and 5434 
 
* There is no payment for temporary incapacity. 
** Health care expenditures are paid through the health care system. 
Source: Office of the Secretary-General for EU Affairs (2006). BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON TURKEY | 35 
 
Table 20. Types of social insurance to be provided by the social security administration after 
the reforms take effect in 2007 
 
* There is no payment for temporary incapacity. 
** Health care expenditures are paid through the health care system. 
Source: Office of the Secretary-General for EU Affairs (2006). 
Although the total spending of social protection institutions including social assistance and 
social services as a share of GDP is quite high – 12.1% in 2005 – the existing system is not 
effective at preventing poverty. The problem with the social security system is that coverage by 
system requires having a job in the formal sector. Apart from voluntary social insurance plans 
offered by the Bag-Kur, the entire social security system (including the recently introduced 
unemployment insurance) provides benefits to individuals holding formal jobs, and hence 
excludes those who are not somehow connected to the formal labour market. This implies that 
households headed by unregistered workers or those in the informal sector face higher risks of 
poverty and unregistered workers have a rather high share in the labour force.  
According to estimations by TURKSTAT, in the first four months of 2005 about 11 million 
workers were unregistered, representing half of the 22 million workers in the labour force. This 
estimate is also consistent with the recent household survey conducted by the World Bank, 
which reveals that more than one-third of the population is not covered by social insurance 
(Bugra & Keyder, 2006). The foremost groups not covered are unpaid family workers and 
casual, daily-waged and seasonal employees, who also constitute an important share of 
unregistered employment. Unregistered employment peaks in agriculture (90%) followed by 
daily-waged occupations, for instance in construction (Table 21). To add to this picture, to be 
able to benefit from the recently introduced unemployment insurance, one similarly has to have 
worked in the formal sector. In fact, only workers who have paid premiums for at least 600 days 
in the last three years, including full contributions for the last 120 days prior to unemployment, 
and who have lost their job involuntarily or through no fault of their own, can benefit from 
unemployment insurance. 
Thus, Turkey’s social protection system lacks mechanisms to target economically vulnerable 
groups and there are large gaps in the social safety net. 36 | ADAMAN, CARKOGLU, ERZAN, FILIZTEKIN, OZKAYNAK, SAYAN & ULGEN 
Table 21. Employment status and registration with a social security institution 
(per 1,000 persons) 
 2004  2005 
  Total 
employment 
Unregistered 
(%) 
Total  
employment 
Unregistered 
(%) 
Total  21,117 52.0  21,413 49.1 
Salary/wage  earner 9,260 21.1  10,336 22.9 
Daily-waged  1,786 91.6  1,582 92.2 
Employer  977 22.1  1,085 24.2 
Self-employed 4,944  64  5,012  63.6 
Non-paid 
family worker 
4,150 96.4  3,397 95.2 
Agricultural  6,824 90.1  5,969 88.1 
Salary/wage  earner  99 49.2  116 52.3 
Daily-waged  390 98.4  400 98.3 
Employer  73 73.5  82 66.4 
Self-employed  2,651 79.4  2,489 77.5 
Non-paid 
family worker 
3,611 98.4  2,881 97.9 
Non-agricultural 14,293  33.8  15,444  34 
Salary/wage  earner 9,161 20.8  10,219 22.6 
Seasonal  worker  1,396 89.8  1,183 90.2 
Employer  904 17.9  1,003 20.7 
Self-employed  2,293 46.2  2,523 50.0 
Non-paid 
family worker 
539 83.2  516 80.1 
Source: TUIK, Household Labour Force Surveys. 
At this point, attention should be paid to the fact that women account for more than 60% of the 
working population who are unpaid. Hence, from a gender perspective, a significant difference 
exists between women and men covered by social insurance, with women more likely to be 
excluded from the system. According to the results of the Household Income and Consumption 
Survey in 2002, while 51% of men are under the coverage of social insurance, this rate 
decreases to 24% for women.
18 
Unfortunately, in the field of social assistance and services, Turkey does not yet have a 
comprehensive system at the national level, based on a single definition of poverty. Social 
assistance programmes cannot systematically reach all those in need because of the fractured 
nature of the social assistance system and limited funding available to these programmes. Cash 
transfers are almost non-existent. Social assistance is mostly limited to temporary transfers in-
kind channelled through the local chapters of the General Directorate for Social Assistance and 
Solidarity, a number of programmes for the elderly and the disabled, and the institutional care of 
children and the elderly as administered by SHCEK.  
5.5 Taxation 
While tax structures and policies vary widely among countries, the Turkish tax system is 
noticeably complex, as it has been subjected to numerous changes without a coherent strategy 
                                                 
18 Dependants benefiting from sickness, widow’s and orphan’s pension rights are not included in this 
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for reforming the system. The system can be classified under three headings: 1) income taxes, 2) 
taxes on expenditures, and 3) taxes on wealth. Table 22, while showing the composition of tax 
revenues in Turkey, also illustrates the disturbing pattern of ever-increasing reliance on indirect 
taxes. In fact, as Zenginobuz (2005) rightly notes, the current tax system has significantly 
deviated from an optimal tax structure where the tax burden is distributed more evenly among 
tax instruments for reasons of economic efficiency as well as fairness. 
Table 22. Composition of tax revenues (as a % of total tax revenues) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Taxes on Income 39.6 39.4 32.4 30.5 29
Corporate Tax 23.4 29.1 23 20.2 19.5
Taxes on Wealth 1.3 1.1 1.2 2.5 1.82
Motor Vehicles Tax 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.76
Inheritance and Gift Tax 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.06
Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services 42.9 45.6 50.4 52.1 52.1
Domestic VAT 16.9 18.3 19.4 18.3 18.5
Motor Vehicles Purchase Tax 1.6 0.8 0.8 0 0
Additional Tax 22 . 1 3 . 30 0
Special Consumption Tax 000 2 6 . 4 2 6
Petroleum Consumption Tax 12.3 14.2 18.7 0 0
Banking and Insurance Transaction Tax 3 . 23 . 81 . 71 . 41 . 4
Stamp Duty 2.7 2.1 2.2 2 1.9
Other Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services 4.1 4.2 4.4 4 4.3
Taxes on Foreign Trade 16.2 14 15.9 14.9 16.8
VAT on Import 14.7 13 14.9 13.8 15.5
Other Taxes on Foreign Trade 1.7 1.5 1 1.1 1.3  
Source: Ministry of Finance as per Zenginobuz (2005). 
A very sharp increase in revenues from consumption taxes of one sort or another has created a 
situation whereby indirect tax revenue now exceeds 70% of the total revenue collected 
(Zenginobuz, 2005). Despite recent reductions (planned to continue in the months ahead), taxes 
on capital are also quite high by international standards. With large reductions elsewhere, 
Turkey’s corporate income tax rate (around 44%) is now one of the highest among OECD and 
EU countries. Table 23 shows the distribution of the tax burden on capital income for 2004 and 
2005. 
Table 23. Effective tax burden on capital income, 2004–05 
 2004  2005 
1) Gross profit  100  100 
2) Corporate taxes paid = (1)x0.33  33  30 
3) Gross dividends = (1)-(2)  67  70 
4) Tax on dividends = (3)x0.10  7  7 
5) Net dividends = (3)-(4)  60  63 
6) Net capital income tax base  67  70 
7) Exemptions = (6)x0.50  33  35 
8) Taxable capital income = (6)-(7)  33  35 
9) Capital income tax = (8)x0.45  15  14 
10) Tax rebate  7  7 
11) Capital income tax to be paid = (9)-(10)  8  7 
12) Total tax burden = (2)+(4)+(11)   48  44 
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On the labour front, it is not possible to find a categorical tax wedge in a unified framework 
applying to all workers. Yet, recent studies on the issue (Zenginobuz, 2005; Economic Research 
Forum & Institut de la Méditerranée, 2005) indicate that Turkey’s tax wedge on labour 
(composed of the income taxes and social security contributions (SSCs) of employers and 
employees on gross labour income) amounted to 41% in 2005 – the highest rate among OECD 
countries. This rate is around 25% in Ireland and 30% in the UK (Economic Research Forum & 
Institut de la Méditerranée, 2005). For the members of the SSK, these SSCs for employees are 
equal to 14% of gross wages. For employers, the SSCs vary between 19.5% and 25% of gross 
wages according to the occupational risk premium. There is also an additional premium of 1% 
and 2% of gross wages paid by the employee and employer respectively (see Table 24). 
The income taxes on wages are progressive and vary between 15% and 35%. These rates are 
applied to the gross wages after the SSCs of the employees are deducted. There is also an 
additional 0.6% stamp tax paid over the gross wage. Accordingly, the tax wedge for the 
minimum wage as a percentage of the total labour cost is calculated as 41% (see Table 24). It is 
often argued that the high share of unregistered workers in Turkey is at least partially caused by 
unreasonably high non-wage labour costs.  
These figures demonstrate that tax rates are in general very high in Turkey. Overall, personal 
and corporate income taxes create a wedge between gross income and net income, so they have 
a significant impact on labour supply and business investment decisions. In fact, the overall tax 
burden on the Turkish economy has shot up in an unprecedented manner by over 10 percentage 
points since the beginning of the 1990s. Today, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP in Turkey, 
which was around 34% in 2004, is high compared with the average of 21.3% for all upper-
middle-income countries. Although still below the OECD and EU averages, this rate is fast 
approaching them since most OECD and EU countries are reducing their tax-to-GDP rates. As 
Zenginobuz (2005) rightly notes, with GDP per capita well below OECD and EU averages, 
Turkey has probably reached the upper limit of how much tax burden it can impose on its 
economy.  
Table 24. Tax burden on wages in Turkey, 2005 
 Minimum  wage 
(TRY) 
Average wage 
(TRY) 
(1) Gross monthly salary  489  800 
(2) Employee contributions to social insurance 
(old-age, health benefits, etc.) = (1)x0.14 
68 112 
(3) Employee contributions to unemployment insurance 
= (1)x0.01 
5 8 
(4) Income tax base = (1)-(2)-(3)  415  680 
(5) Income tax = (4)x0.15  62  102 
(6) Stamp tax = (1)x0.006  3  5 
(7) Total taxes and contributions = (2)+(3)+(5)+(6)  139  227 
(8) Net salary = (1)-(7)  350  573 
(9) Employer contributions to social insurance 
(old-age, health benefits, etc.) = (1)x0.195 
95 15 
(10) Employer contributions to unemployment insurance = (1)x0.02  10  16 
(11) Total cost to the employer = (1)+(9)+(10)  594  972 
Memorandum 
(12) Percentage deviation between (1) and (11) as a % of (1)  21.5  21.5 
(13) Tax wedge as a % of total labour cost ((7)+(9)+(10))/(11)  41  27 
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In fact, as the Economic Research Forum & Institut de la Méditerranée (2005) report argues, 
with such high tax rates, Turkey should have achieved an even higher total-tax-to-GDP ratio 
than 34%. This ratio is primarily owing to the large share of employment being declared at the 
minimum wage by both employees and employers in order to reduce their tax burden and the 
large degree of informal employment in the economy. Rather than piecemeal changes, the 
country has to introduce a comprehensive tax reform that will substantially simplify the overall 
tax structure and seek to lower personal income and social security taxes, while broadening the 
tax base by introducing a relatively low flat tax and simultaneously modernising the tax 
administration. A simple tax regime with low rates will surely facilitate tax enforcement and 
compliance. Of course, this approach should be complemented by a campaign to reduce the size 
of the unregistered economy.  
More specifically, Zenginobuz (2005) puts forward the following recommendations:  
1)  Excessive consumption taxes should be curtailed by optimally readjusting the tax mix.  
2)  The tax wedge on labour should be cut at least by half to promote employment.  
3)  Taxes on corporate income should be lowered to levels comparable to those in EU 
countries that compete for FDI.  
4)  A simpler and flatter personal income tax regime with lower rates should be adopted 
along with a reduction in tax expenditures and the elimination of tax breaks.  
5)  A comprehensive flat tax structure involving a single rate for all sources of income would 
provide strong incentives for increasing investments, employment and business activity in 
general. 
The negotiation process with the EU provides an opportunity for Turkey to further review its tax 
policies and shape them in a way to bring about the competitive and efficient policy 
environment needed. 
5.6  Gender equality and anti-discrimination 
In Turkey, the adoption of gender-neutral laws early in Republican history still plays a critical 
role and the legal framework constitutes the backbone of gender equality. The Civil Code 
(2002), the Labour Act (2003) and the very recent Penal Code (2005) effectively improve some 
of the most problematic provisions of earlier legislation in these areas insofar as gender equality 
is concerned. The national machinery for the advancement of women has also been strengthened 
with the entry into force, in 2004, of the Organisational Law on the Directorate General for the 
Status and Problems of Women, and the establishment of the Consultative Council for the 
Status of Women, to ensure better policy formulation and coordination. The Compulsory Basic 
Education Law of 1997 had already made an important contribution to girls’ education by 
raising the number of female students especially from rural areas, as had the national campaign 
“Support for the Schooling of Girls”.  
The CEDAW (2005) report gives a clear picture of positive aspects and areas of concern and 
further improvements needed for Turkey in the elimination of discrimination against women. 
Accordingly, the new Penal Code (2005) defines sexual crimes as crimes committed against the 
individual rather than against public decency. For the first time, the Code covered marital rape 
and sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as trafficking in persons. In addition to the 
annulment, in 2000, of a provision allowing for leniency for perpetrators of honour crimes, the 
new Code imposes life sentences for perpetrators, thus reinforcing the Government’s 
determination to prevent such crimes.  
Yet, as mentioned by the CEDAW (2005) report as well, the full transposition of these 
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achieved, traditional values and customs continue to have an impact on the practical 
implementation of the new laws. Violence against women, including domestic violence and 
honour killings are still important concerns. Women, as victims of violence, are in general 
unaware of their rights and the protection mechanisms available to them under the law. 
Moreover, support services for women who are victims of violence (including shelters) are 
inadequate in number. 
Women’s persistent under-representation in political decision-making is a democratic deficit in 
Turkey. While there are high proportions of women in professions and in academia, only 4% of 
seats in parliament are held by women, and in the cabinet only one minister is a woman. 
Women’s representation in local government is also very low. Women have recently begun to 
show significant interest in participating in politics, however. It is hoped that a leap forward will 
take place in the near future. Of course, despite progress, regional disparities continue and it is 
apparent that women’s active participation in politics and in the senior management of public 
administration at all levels (local, regional, national and European) in Turkey should be further 
promoted (World Bank, 2003; CEDAW, 2005). 
6. Governance  structures 
6.1  Governance efficiency in general and in the social protection system 
in particular 
The style of political governance in the country needs to be transformed from a paternalistic, 
top-down and patronage-based modality to a form of transparent, accountable and efficient 
governance that is responsive to citizen’s demands, that acknowledges its citizens as 
stakeholders and that encourages a participatory decision-making process. Although in recent 
years there have been important steps in that direction, formidable tasks remain with respect to 
improving the transparency and efficiency of public expenditure management. In addition, there 
are the tasks of upgrading public accounting, procurement and audit standards, of enhancing 
democratic principles and participatory mechanisms, of fighting against corruption and ensuring 
prudent, public liability management. 
Studies conducted on the political economy of Turkey largely concur that the paternalistic 
administration inherited from the Ottoman era – where the strong-state tradition meant a state-
centric way of governing society from above by assuming a unity between the state and nation, 
as well as between national interests and state interests – began to make way for a patronage-
based approach following the transition to a multi-party democracy in 1946.
19 The embryonic 
nature of the civil society, constraints on political freedom and rights, calcification of the 
bureaucratic apparatus and the continued strong position of the army were simultaneously the 
causes and the outcomes of this very process.  
The “centre–periphery” dichotomy, first proposed by Mardin (1973), provides a theoretical 
framework for explaining the functioning of the political clientelism that has been shaping, with 
varying degrees, public life in Turkey. In this context, local and central governments abuse their 
authorities and responsibilities while engaging in reciprocal relationships with third parties in 
the creation and allocation of resources. These abuses may range from the choice of the location 
of a public investment (say an airport or a public hospital) to tolerating illegal shanty housing, 
or from granting import permits or licenses to public tenders.  
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To these ‘grand’ types of corruption, one should add as well the kinds of administrative ones, 
where individual civil servants violate the principles of public impartiality, justice and equality, 
more often not in return for monetary gain (bribes), but rather because of the existence of 
reciprocal networks (most of which are of the extended-family type).  
The picture grows even more complicated when helpless officers running underfunded public 
facilities find no other means but to collect money from the users of their facilities in order to 
make them reasonably functional. The classic example concerns attempts by primary/secondary 
school directors to force parents to make ‘voluntary contributions’ to help run schools with a 
minimum level of standards – usually the money is requested in the name of ‘heating funds’. 
Such payments are of course not subject to any public control, and thus for citizens the situation 
may well be perceived as yet another manifestation of governmental failure. 
A glance at the World Bank’s governance indicators for Turkey should enable us to position 
Turkey vis-à-vis European countries. As is known, the methodology of the World Bank consists 
of constructing measures for six dimensions of governance: 
1)  voice and accountability (which measures political, civil and human rights); 
2)  political instability and violence (which measures the likelihood of violent threats to, or 
changes in, government); 
3)  government effectiveness (which measures the competence of the bureaucracy and the 
quality of public service delivery); 
4)  regulatory burden (which measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies); 
5)  rule of law (which measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence); and 
6)  control of corruption (which measures the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption and state capture). 
The percentile ranks for Turkey for the year 2004 are (in order) 41.7, 30.6, 57.2, 48.8, 54.6 and 
50.7, respectively. As such, they are well below the EU-15 as well as Central and Eastern 
European countries. Although when compared with the previous years’ results positive 
developments can be observed, it is clear that Turkey should make substantial and continued 
efforts towards improving its levels of governance.  
As mentioned above, in the last few years a series of steps have been undertaken to improve 
governance efficiency throughout the country. To provide a snapshot of these steps one can 
easily cite the following actions – some initiated by international players, some forced by local 
movements and some formulated at the governmental level. 
•  Much has been done to strengthen the legal and regulatory framework for bank 
supervision, to carry out a financial clean-up of the banking system, to reform the 
governance structure for the state banks and to ensure that private banks are properly 
capitalised. Remembering the high financial and social costs of the 2001 crisis, during 
which the financial sector was left largely unregulated, a series of regulatory mechanisms 
have been created. 
•  The action plan for increased transparency and efficient public administration was 
approved in 2002. Strategic planning, a total quality approach and measures to increase 
transparency were the key ingredients of this plan (discussed in further detail below). 
•  In relation to anti-corruption policy, in recent years Turkey has ratified or signed a series 
of international agreements: the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 
was ratified; the OECD’s Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Officials in International 
Business Transactions was signed; and the UN Convention against Corruption was 
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•  The total quality approach in some of the public institutions and organisations is now 
being applied, which requires fulfilling the criteria to obtain the ISO 9001 and ISO 9002 
quality certificates. 
•  A regulation on the code of ethics for public employees entered into force in 2005, which 
sets out a detailed code of behaviour for senior public officials. 
•  The new Penal Code contains provisions with regard to bribery, trading in influence, 
abuse of power and embezzlement, and introduces the concept of liability of legal persons 
in cases of corruption. 
•  A series of actions have been undertaken to increase accountability, some of which 
include 
–  taking a strategic planning approach that incorporates the concept of accountability 
in terms of meeting the targets set out in plans; and 
–  obliging all public agencies provide a written answer to any request/question they 
may receive, coming from either the public, the media or any other third parties 
(following the Law on Access to Information adopted in 2003). 
That being said, Turkey has a long way to go to comply in a fuller sense with the requirements 
of the principles of good governance, with the main problem being the persistence of profound 
corruption in almost every aspect of the public sphere. The current performance of Turkey in 
terms of corruption is alarming. According to Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index and the surveys conducted in 2001 and 2002,
20 Turkey continues to suffer 
from corruption – be it petty or grand. Turkey has also seen its share of high-level politicians 
come under the spotlight (recall that one former prime minister and seven former ministers were 
tried before the High Tribunal on charges of corruption). Although as noted above, on paper 
Turkey appears to have ratified or signed many international agreements on anti-corruption 
policy, the persistence of corrupt activities largely indicates that whatever the intentions have 
been, these are a whitewash. To accentuate the last point, one should also add that the Anti-
Corruption Steering Committee is not properly functional at this time. The responsibility for 
fighting corruption is presently spilt among several organisations and it lacks overall 
coordination. Furthermore, it should be stressed that corruption is usually understood and 
interpreted in its narrower meaning, that is to say, bribery; patronage-based applications are 
nevertheless widespread, as mentioned at the beginning. At the policy formation level there is 
seldom reference to this latter dimension – partly because of the fact that in clientelist 
treatments, it would be difficult to observe illegalities and personal, particularistic interests are 
seldom involved.  
The way in which the budgetary system works is of crucial importance in the discussion on 
governance. Currently, the budgetary system is beset by endemic problems, some of which take 
on greater importance under coalition governments (see, for example, chapter IV of the 2005 
report by the Economic Research Forum & Institut de la Méditerranée). First, owing to inner 
struggles within the government, total resources and expenditures may not match, with the usual 
outcome being excessive spending. Second, policy objectives may not always be adequately 
funded in strategic decision-making. Third, the system may fall short of providing efficient and 
effective resource allocations. Finally, and above all, the system largely lacks accountability and 
transparency. 
In a related manner, the control and auditing mechanism does not base its assessments on 
performance and thus it plays a very limited role in preventing waste and fraud. Similarly, 
quality control and in this context satisfaction with service delivery have been introduced too 
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late and in too few public institutions. Research surveys conducted in Turkey repeatedly 
indicate that citizens are generally are not at all satisfied with the quality of public services (see, 
for example, Adaman et al., 2001 and 2002). 
On the other side of the coin is the way in which public servants have been acting. The overall 
competence level of public servants is low, and there are strong incentives in relation to moral 
hazard: the pay system is inefficient in the sense that there is no wage differentiation as a 
function of performance and political preferences may at times undercut merit principles. When 
the competence level of bureaucrats is low and when the pay system is not dependent on their 
performance, red tape is likely to increase. Indeed, red tape continues to be a grave problem, on 
the one hand giving rise to transaction costs and on the other hand breeding corruption. Finally, 
parliamentary immunity continues to hold. More specifically, many public bodies are exempt 
from auditing requirements. Although public officials in Turkey are required to submit 
declarations of their assets, their verifications are seldom checked.  
An important development in Turkey in recent years, which has implications for governance, is 
the devolution process. There have been favourable conditions for accomplishing 
decentralisation and the delegation of power from the central government down to the local 
levels. In this regard, the Law on Municipalities and the Law on Special Provincial 
Administrations, both of which entered into force in 2005, aim at strengthening the capacity of 
local governments to deal with the challenges of rapid urbanisation and mass migration from 
rural areas. These laws introduce modern public management concepts in order to create 
efficient, results-oriented and transparent local government. And at the operational level, these 
reforms seek to incorporate requirements, inter alia, for strategic planning, emergency planning, 
debt and borrowing limits, and performance-based budgeting.  
As an overall observation, the traditions and the institutions by which authority is exercised 
continue to pose severe difficulties for the governance structure of Turkey. A first point 
meriting attention is the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced. Notable 
in this respect are serious violations of democratic rights as well as a lack of democratic culture 
within political parties (political parties are highly disciplined and only on rare occasions do 
representatives vote against their party line – and when they do they are usually expelled from 
their parties).  
The second point is to do with the capacity of government to formulate and implement policies, 
where major shortcomings can be observed in the effectiveness of governments as well as 
deficiencies in the regulatory qualities. The competence levels of state officers are quite low, the 
existing incentive structures do not sufficiently promote efficiency and effectiveness, and civil 
servants are mostly influenced by political processes. While the cabinet may not have full 
control over a powerful bureaucracy that maintains intact a long-term policy vision in some 
ministries, the cabinet has great influence over the actions of bureaucrats by and large. At the 
same time, in cases where there is little bureaucratic tradition, there is a more open structure for 
outside influence from business, both domestic and international. Beyond the influence of 
business, agricultural and labour organisations also have access to policy-making processes. 
Yet, their influence usually involves creating and maintaining economic rent and patronage, 
rather than providing expertise and general guidance, which mostly promotes a short-term 
vision in the political life of Turkey.  
And finally, concerning institutions that govern interactions between citizens and the state and 
among themselves, patron–client types of networks appear to be rather powerful in policy-
making, endangering the whole democratisation process. The existence of the informal sector 
further aggravates the situation, as informality if not illegality is perceived by the overwhelming 
majority as the norm of society. All these diagnoses are more or less valid at the local level of 
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making apparatus than the prime minister or even the cabinet, some kinds of influences are 
much more easily projected than are others. For instance, the peddling of private patronage and 
influence is more easily accomplished at the local level. Such influence can also easily be 
conducted based on ethnic or religious sectarian backgrounds, which is a direct violation of the 
basic rights of the Constitution.  
When the picture of general governance efficiency is drawn as such, one should not be surprised 
to see similar sets of problems in the governance of the social protection system. As previously 
noted, the main problem with the social protection system is that the bulk of the present 
protection is contingent on being employed in the formal sector. Unemployed individuals or 
those who are working in the informal sector are basically outside the coverage system. This in 
turn means that a large portion of society cannot be reached through current official channels 
(legislative procedures). As by definition we are talking about an unofficial, unregistered sector, 
collecting funds and taxes would simply not be possible. Furthermore, some legal, registered 
enterprises have a dual structure in the sense that some of their activities are undertaken through 
informal methods. It is unfortunate that the informality problem is usually considered in official 
discourse as a perversity that can be remedied through more effective policing activities, and 
thus its structural causes are not given due consideration. 
Aside from this very important aspect, the social protection system suffers from a lack of 
competence, as well as from mismanagement and fraud (as discussed in length in Adaman, 
2003). More specifically, first, there is no well-defined formula or criteria for allocating 
resources in the case of social protection, which may mean the existence of distortions in the 
needs-based principle. Second, because of the lack of transparency and accountability, it is 
rather difficult to assess the how effective and impartial policies are or how well they are 
implemented. Third, as the overall structure of the social protection system is too scattered, it is 
feared that the system is encumbered by many inefficiencies. And fourth, low levels of 
competence, coupled with improper incentive structures, brings about low levels of productivity 
on the part of state officers in the social protection systems.  
6.2  The character and capacity of the social partners and social dialogue 
There are a number of institutions at the local and national levels to encourage bipartite or 
tripartite social dialogue. Among these one can cite bodies such as 
•  the Minimum Wage Determination Committee, which consists of representatives from the 
government, trade union confederations and employer associations, with the aim of 
setting the minimum wage;  
•  the Supreme Arbitration Board, which includes representatives from the trade union 
confederations and employer associations as well as representatives of an impartial third 
party (usually academics), with the aim of resolving conflicts arising from the decisions 
of governments to ban or postpone strikes;  
•  the Provincial Employment Committees, which include governors, local representatives 
from ISKUR and relevant ministries, employer and employee organisations, boards of 
commerce and industry and academics, with the goal of contributing to employment 
policy-making; and 
•  the Economic and Social Council, which was created as an overarching advisory body – 
and therefore deserves more attention (Tunali, 2003). 
The Council was established in 1995 (and its formal status was affirmed in 2001) to address key 
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•  a deputy prime minister(s);  
•  ministers of finance, labour and social security, industry and trade, agriculture, energy and 
natural resources;  
•  undersecretaries on related issues;  
•  the Union of Chambers of Commerce and the Stock Exchange of Turkey;  
•  the Confederation of Tradesmen and Artisans of Turkey;  
•  the Union of Chambers of Agriculture of Turkey; and  
•  the three workers’ confederations (DISK, TURKIS and HAKIS).  
The first goal was to provide consultation to the government on key economic and social issues 
and to actively involve organised civil society in economic and social policy-making in Turkey. 
The second and somewhat indirect goal was seen as its contribution to the democratisation 
process of the country in the area of decision-making on major economic and social issues. 
Despite its potential importance, the Council has not yet produced any results; rather it has acted 
as a talking shop where statements are delivered and inconclusive discussions take place. One of 
the members, DISK, has recently resigned from the board, making allegations about the legal 
restrictions on unionisation as well as about the existence of the informal economy. It is 
therefore no surprise that the Joint Declaration of the EU–Turkey Joint Consultative Committee, 
held on 13-14 July 2006, emphasised that the Council “needs to develop into a significant 
element in the democratisation process and take part in the economic and social policy-making 
in Turkey”. The Declaration also stressed that the composition of the Council “needs to be 
reshaped by increasing the number of representatives from civil society and by changing the 
role of the government representatives”. 
But to the extent that the informal sector continues to have an impact on economic and social 
spheres and that the composition of the Council continues to represent the formal sector, 
informality can only be voiced through the perspectives of the present members and therefore it 
cannot have a direct presence. Informality in Turkey has an embedded structure; thus, it cannot 
be dealt with solely by increasing the inspection frequency and raising fines. And seeing 
informality only as a perverse phenomenon misses important dynamics in the economic and 
social aspects of Turkey.  
In fact, both business and trade unions influence governments principally through semi-
structured and sometimes informal channels. Religious brotherhoods are also said to have an 
influence in policy-making (however, no reliable academic work on this relationship is yet 
available and these claims remain mere speculations and conspiracy-theorising at best). One 
should at this point remember the persistence of heavy patron–client networks in the country; 
hence, one may rightly speculate that the nature of these interactions would be inclined towards 
rent-seeking. 
The international community through the European Commission, the World Bank and the IMF 
has traditionally been active in shaping policy-making in Turkey. Especially in the area of 
economic policy there are institutionalised mechanisms through which such influence is 
channelled.  
Only in the last couple of years, have mere NGOs also been asked to provide inputs into the 
policy-making processes. Yet, such NGOs are either directly linked to the policy-making 
bureaucracy or they are sympathisers with the ruling party or coalition. Unless such a link is 
present, no serious input can be made by any NGO. Another difficulty of the Turkish third 
sector of think tanks and NGOs is that they lack special areas of expertise that can be 
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6.3  Civil society organisations 
Trust as a measure of social capital in Turkey remains very low compared with other countries. 
World Values Surveys show that from the early 1990s to the present, interpersonal trust in 
Turkey has remained low at around 7-10%, with the trust figure at 9.8% in 1990 and 6.5% in 
1997. In 2006, using identical questions, Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu (2006) found that 7.3% 
reported that people in general could be trusted. World Values Surveys have found that Croatia, 
Latvia, Romania and Portugal are the closest in this respect to Turkey. 
Not surprisingly, membership in civil society organisations also remains very low in the 
country. World Values Surveys reported 7% in 1997 and Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu (2006) found 
7.4% in 2006. Membership here is self-reported membership and not all institutions are equally 
likely to be covered. World Values Surveys also report that in all different types of civil society 
organisations, such as religious, sports, cultural, professional, philanthropic and environmental 
ones, Turkish participation rates are well below those of the world averages. The only exception 
is political party membership. Still, in a country where political patronage is the name of the 
game such reporting is not very reliable. In other words, respondents are likely to have reported 
their party membership relatively more frequently than they otherwise would admit, thinking 
that their reported party membership is likely to benefit them in the patronage distribution.  
The numbers of civil society institutions are not terribly low in Turkey. The relatively low 
membership rates lead one to seek an explanation in the dual character of Turkish society. The 
more prevalent reason for such low participation rates seems to be that the same individuals of 
relatively higher education and socio-economic status tend to be members of more than a single 
organisation. The divide in participation rates is also apparent geographically as well. The 
relatively better off and developed coastal, western provinces and especially urban settlements 
have more civil society activities than rural areas. 
Religious organisations are most probably to remain uncovered in these studies. Most 
brotherhoods are outlawed and thus are unlikely to be discussed in self-reported membership 
questions. More importantly, such organisations are not as membership-driven as their 
counterparts in the West might be. It is more likely that there is a community approach strongly 
encouraging certain types of behaviour and banning others. Although no solid data on such 
phenomena exists, limited qualitative descriptions lead one to think that neither membership, 
nor the types of activities members become engaged in during their membership are voluntary 
and freely driven in such religious organisations. It is to be expected that they are mobilised in a 
more hierarchical and tightly controlled manner, and are closed to any input from beyond that of 
close organisational networks. As such, these organisations may not be correctly defined as civil 
society organisations but rather of a suis generis type that resembles community interest groups. 
Increasingly, local government initiatives are gaining importance in Turkish public policy. This 
trend obviously provides many opportunities for local civil society organisations to participate 
in the policy-making process. In many settings, participation does take place and it is impossible 
to keep track of such initiatives and provide a performance evaluation for them. Nevertheless, 
several observations seem to be replicated in many instances. One pattern emerges from the fact 
that these civil society organisations are devoid of significant expertise relevant to policy and 
knowledge-based projects. Thus, they eventually become subservient to either business interests 
or the local or central bureaucratic expertise. Their typically weak financial standing also helps 
to maintain their low level of information-based activism and drives them towards being either 
mere followers or simple rejectionist protesters, but not into a position of being potent and 
effective participants in the policy-making process. 
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7. Specific  issues 
One issue that not only constantly arises in discussions on the Turkish economy and society but 
also provides an overall explanatory context concerns the obvious dual character of Turkish 
society in many – if not all relevant respects. Turkish social science literature considers this 
within the paradigmatic debate on the centre vs. periphery cleavage in Turkish society.  
The centre–periphery framework stems from Mardin’s (1973) interpretation of the socio-
political history of Ottoman Turks. According to Mardin, Turkish politics is built around a 
strong and coherent state apparatus run by a distinct group of elites dominated by the military 
and bureaucracy. The ‘centre’ is confronted by a heterogeneous and often hostile ‘periphery’, 
composed mainly of the peasantry, small farmers and artisans. The centre is built around 
Kemalist secular principles. It represents a state-run nationalist modernisation programme. The 
periphery reflects the salient features of a subject and a parochial orientation. It is built around 
hostile sentiments towards the coercive modernisation project of the centre and it includes 
regional, religious and ethnic groups with often-conflicting interests and political strategies.  
A predominantly rural Turkey of the 1950s, with its mostly isolated villages, limited mass 
education, transportation and communications facilities was perhaps more fitting for the centre–
periphery framework. Over the past five decades, significant advances have been made across 
all dimensions of development that may be taken as a reflection of an integration of the 
periphery with the centre. “Typical villagers of earlier decades, who lived in closed 
communities and had little contact with outsiders, are fast disappearing. Rather, the typical 
villager is more likely to have relatives or former neighbours in the big cities of Turkey or 
Europe” (Toprak, 1996, p. 94). Yet, despite a more open Turkish society, which had largely 
been integrated through wider access to communications and transportation, the extent of the 
transformation into a modern social order is not so clear.  
Esmer (1999) provides some clues as to the extent of differentiation between the value systems 
of the centre and the periphery. The level of trust in various institutions is slightly lower among 
the more highly educated representatives of the centre than it is among the relatively less 
educated respondents (p. 49) of the periphery. Differences that are more significant are observed 
in respondents’ evaluations of the shortcomings of democracy.
21 In rural areas, respondents 
seem more supportive of a ‘powerful’ leader and military rule by far. Similarly, while the highly 
educated representatives of the centre seem to believe in the legitimacy of the democratic 
system in the country, among the peripheral representatives the legitimacy of the democratic 
system is considerably lower. More striking are the huge differences between the centre and the 
periphery representatives’ overall levels of tolerance in social relations. Esmer’s (1999, pp. 88–
90) overall tolerance index shows that the less educated representatives of the periphery are 
significantly less tolerant than the more highly educated centre.  
On the political front, there is ample evidence of the continuity of the centre–periphery 
cleavage. Kalaycioglu’s (1994) analysis of the data gathered in the 1990 Turkish Values Survey 
reveals “the continued importance of the conflict between the values of the centre versus the 
values of the periphery”, which has come to be signified by religiosity. Alongside religiosity in 
determining party choice, other typical variables reflecting peripheral traits such as ethnicity and 
place of residence are also found to be significant in the voting decisions of Turkish citizens 
(Kalaycioglu, 1999, pp. 64–66; Carkoglu & Toprak, 2000, pp. 117–18). 
                                                 
21  For example, while 37% of rural respondents agree with the statement that in democracies the 
maintenance of public order is difficult, among urban settlers only 26% seem to agree with this argument 
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Regional disparities in socio-economic development indicators are not only representations of 
the continuing centre–periphery cleavage but they are also factors that support and maintain 
such divisions. These divisions often overlap with ethnic and sectarian divisions as well. For 
example, it is not surprising to observe that the least developed south-eastern and eastern 
provinces in the country are predominantly inhabited by the Kurdish minority. Similarly, but 
much more subtly, the Alevi minority in the country suffers relative deprivation. Yet official 
statistics on these issues are simply non-existent. 
As noted above, Turkish values and economic behavioural patterns and structures of various 
kinds are clearly separated from one another on a simple rural–urban divide. Turkish rural areas 
heavily depend on agriculture, the relative weight of which has been declining over the years. 
Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the working population still resides in rural areas and is 
employed in agricultural activities. The influence of agricultural support prices over the last 
several decades, and the impacts of intensifying globalisation together with internationalised 
ethnic conflict in the country have all slowly but decisively changed old patterns in the Turkish 
agricultural sector. The shift to an open economy has shown how competitive Turkish 
agriculture is. For many products, it became apparent that productivity was low and protection 
was necessary if the excess labour was to be kept in rural areas rather than being pushed into 
urban settlements, which are totally unprepared for a new influx. A similar experience was in 
effect when the ethnic conflict in the south-eastern provinces drove rural populations into urban 
areas. A significant share of the rural population in eastern and south-eastern Turkey had been 
engaged in animal husbandry. When these populations moved to the cities because of ethnic 
conflict, stockbreeding collapsed. Thus, ethnic conflict has had an impact on the nature of 
agricultural activity as well. Relatively sudden population movements from rural to urban areas 
not only distort productive capacity in both areas but also have ramifications on poverty and 
informality in urban areas. These migratory movements inflate the excess labour supply in 
urban areas, which drives down labour costs, especially in the informal sectors. As such, the 
labour absorption capacity of the Turkish economy is linked to poverty, informality, taxation 
and regulation policies as well as the agricultural sector in the country.  
Finally, we should underline the fact that the vulnerability of the newly urbanised populations is 
not the same for men and women. Turkey has long had a problem with equalising educational 
opportunities for men and women. While from a health-policy perspective women tend to have 
a longer life expectancy, their level of schooling has remained well below that for men. 
Although educational opportunities for women are much higher in urban settings compared with 
those available in rural areas, their transition from a newly migrated, unqualified labour force 
into an educated, qualified labour force takes generations and requires concerted efforts by the 
education sector. Such effective policy implementation is lacking and thus the problems of 
newly uprooted and urbanised women remain a big issue in the country. One relatively 
advantageous diagnosis is the fact that women’s labour participation remains well below 
European levels, at around the low figure of 20%. Thus, migration from rural to urban areas 
does not immediately pose a problem. The low participation rate of women also has a supply-
side deficiency, however, related to the low levels of job creation capacity in urban areas.  
In short, when the Turkish agricultural sector cannot compete with global markets and 
necessarily pushes masses into urban areas, the dual character of Turkish society is brought into 
the urban settlements, where both the centre and the periphery co-exist. This cohabitation 
immediately becomes problematic, with a clash of incompatible value systems fuelled by 
inadequate job creation in urban areas. 
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8. Conclusions 
Turkey’s young population offers a window of opportunity for building up its socio-economic 
infrastructure. To exploit this opportunity, Turkey has to achieve high levels of economic 
growth and employment.  
The skewed income distribution and regional socio-economic differences warrant serious 
consideration if Turkey wishes to promote social sustainability along with economic growth. 
The fact that one out of four persons in Turkey is below the poverty line is alarming, as – to say 
the least – children of the poor are likely to find themselves in the poverty trap in the near 
future, making poverty a self-perpetuating reality. Social assistance is largely insufficient, and 
therefore vulnerable groups are unable to benefit from it enough to have a decent life.  
Another major challenge is the transformation of agriculture. About one-third of the population 
lives in rural areas while the share of agriculture in GDP is considerably less than half that. The 
pace and pattern of urbanisation will shape Turkey’s economic and geographical landscape. 
Expansion of off-farm employment and income generation in rural areas would help to reduce 
migration to the cities. 
Sectoral and micro-economic factors pose major difficulties for the sustainability of economic 
growth. Gains in productivity in hitherto protected sectors, where the state has remained an 
active player, are critical. Deregulation and privatisation efforts are underway in core sectors 
such as energy, telecommunications and transport. The EU provides a blueprint for the 
regulatory path in these areas.  
The dual structure of the Turkish economy, where outward-oriented and competitive modern 
firms co-exist with traditional, family-owned SMEs, has to converge. Turkey needs to improve 
the competitiveness of its substantial segment of SMEs. Less burdensome business regulations 
coupled with increased opportunities for SMEs to access capital are urgently needed. 
Turkish labour costs are considerably lower than are those in Eastern European countries such 
as Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, payroll taxes and severance payments are 
significantly above the average for OECD countries. This, together with stiff labour legislation, 
accounts for a very sizable informal sector. The legislation has to shift from protecting jobs to 
protecting workers. 
The Turkish Employment Organisation was reorganised in 2000 in line with the European 
employment strategy. Adequate resources must be provided for active labour market 
programmes that are effective. Also, the eligibility requirements for unemployment insurance 
must be relaxed. 
Currently, the social security system in Turkey is going through a major overhaul. The 
legislative changes that are near completion mainly have three goals:  
i)  institutional reform to restructure the organisationally fractured system, through creating 
an umbrella agency for coordinating the public provision of all social insurance and social 
assistance services, while harmonising eligibility conditions and the calculation of 
benefits provided by individual agencies;  
ii)  reform of the parameters to restore actuarial balances and to help curb the rapidly growing 
deficits of the publicly managed social-security system; and  
iii)  health care reform to improve access to medical care by all segments of society. 
Good governance indicators reveal the problems that Turkey needs to address. It goes without 
saying that a more democratic, transparent and accountable governance structure, along with an 
effective and efficient resource-allocation mechanism, requires a radical reshaping of the whole 
system. The question that needs to be answered, therefore, boils down to whether society and 
the state are both prepared to launch an all-encompassing reform initiative and, if so, who is 
going to pay the costs of such a transformation.  
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Annex 5.1: Economy, labour market
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
GDP
local currency; constant 1987 prices TURKSTAT
thousand 
YTL 97,888 104,745 112,631 116,114 110,646 118,789 109,885 118,612 125,485 136,693 146,781
Inflation rate
aggregate CPI TURKSTAT 78.1 75.7 101.6 65.9 68.9 35.9 73.2 26.4 16.2 9.5 10.4
Foreign Direct Investment
in USD
TR Central Bank 
(CBRT)
Million 
USD 885 722 805 940 783 982 3,352 1,137 1,752 2,847 9,673
in EUR
Annual Avg. Exch. 
Rates are used for 
conversion.
Million 
Euro 738 1,067 3,756 1,197 1,552 2,291 7,768
Productivity
Labour productivity per person employed Eurostat
(e) estimated; (f) 
forecasted 36.6 (e)  39.6 (e)  39.3 (e)  36.3 39.4 (f)  35.2 (f)  37.0 (f)  38.5 (f)  40.8 (f)  42.8 (f)  43.9 (f)  44.7 (f)
Agriculture CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 1.60 1.64 1.68 1.78 1.72 2.04 1.84 2.09 2.10 2.14 2.54
Mining and Quarrying CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 10.15 9.75 10.54 12.38 12.68 20.73 15.64 12.36 16.72 13.77 13.55
Manufacturing CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 7.72 7.73 8.09 8.15 7.49 7.79 7.26 7.76 8.55 9.10 8.93
Utilities CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 25.93 37.71 30.67 32.01 38.24 42.53 39.28 39.12 43.63 53.73 61.19
Construction CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 4.67 4.71 4.87 4.88 4.15 4.33 5.09 5.58 5.09 4.96 5.30
Trade CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 7.59 8.20 8.65 8.48 7.42 6.98 6.44 6.75 7.20 7.82 7.74
Trans. & Communication CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 14.46 15.06 16.20 15.93 15.81 14.89 14.38 15.77 16.65 16.64 17.52
Fin. Services CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 5.12 4.96 4.97 5.15 5.15 4.25 3.83 3.57 3.14 3.02 2.69
Services CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 1.92 1.94 2.03 1.93 1.80 2.00 1.99 1.99 2.08 2.22 2.15
Aggregate CBRT 1987 Prices YTL 4.34 4.50 4.83 4.86 4.71 4.96 4.62 4.98 5.28 5.60 5.91
average nominal yearly wage - public sector workers
State Planning 
Organization (SPO) YTL 27 36 80 145 340 563 769 1,012 1,285 1,359
average nominal yearly wage - private sector worker SPO YTL 19 35 63 136 250 392 483 693 865 :
average nominal yearly wage - civil servant SPO YTL 12 23 51 92 159 219 325 498 618 701
minimum wage SPO YTL 4 8 16 28 63 84 111 174 226 311
Macroeconomic policies & other indicators
general government revenues; % of GDP Ministry of Finance 17.9 18.0 19.9 22.2 24.2 26.9 29.4 27.5 28.1 25.6 27.67
general government expenditures; % of GDP Ministry of Finance 21.5 25.1 26.1 27.5 33.4 34.2 43.8 38.3 36.2 32.7 29.67
average interest rate - official, for major monetary policy 
instrument CBRT
(ON) Central Bank 
(Interbank) Quotations 
BID (%) (Overnight) : 54.70 54.38 52.22 48.93 6.01 4.98 25.66 36.04 21.85 14.81
3 month interbank offered interest rate :::::::::::
credit to households; % of GDP
credit to households; annual growth rate
average annual exchange rate - local currency per 1 euro CBRT
average of EUR buying 
& selling, CBRT rates :::: 0.446755 0.575325 1.09632 1.433215 1.689365 1.77195 1.67356Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Balance of payments
Goods exports CBRT
Million 
USD 21,636 32,067 32,110 30,662 28,842 30,721 34,373 40,124 51,206 67,047 76,748
Services exports CBRT
Million 
USD 14,939 13,057 19,248 23,171 16,359 19,454 15,199 14,025 17,945 22,928 25,858
Goods imports CBRT
Million 
USD -34,788 -42,331 -47,158 -44,714 -39,027 -52,680 -38,106 -47,407 -65,216 -90,925 -109,467
Services imports CBRT
Million 
USD -5,319 -6,400 -8,336 -9,665 -8,868 -8,088 -6,067 -6,146 -7,441 -10,144 -11,868
current account CBRT
Million 
USD -2,339 -2,437 -2,638 1,984 -1,340 -9,821 3,392 -1,524 -8,036 -15,604 -23,007
worker remittances CBRT
Million 
USD 3,327 3,542 4,197 5,356 4,529 4,560 2,786 1,936 729 804 851
capital and financial account CBRT
Million 
USD -93 938 3,625 -1,287 -377 12,581 -1,633 1,406 3,095 13,337 20,898
 direct investment in reporting country CBRT
Million 
USD 885 722 805 940 783 982 3,352 1,137 1,752 2,847 9,673
Labour market indicators
participation rate
age 15+
total TURKSTAT Total means 15+ 54.1 53.7 52.6 52.8 52.7 49.9 49.8 49.6 48.3 48.7 48.3
male TURKSTAT- LFS Total means 15+ 77.8 77.3 76.8 76.7 75.8 73.7 72.9 71.6 70.4 72.3 72.2
female TURKSTAT- LFS Total means 15+ 30.9 30.6 28.8 29.3 30.0 26.6 27.1 27.9 26.6 25.4 24.8
age 15-24
total TURKSTAT 48.6 48.5 47.0 46.0 46.7 42.5 42.1 40.9 38.4 39.3 38.7
male TURKSTAT- LFS 63.7 63.6 62.5 60.9 60.7 57.6 56.3 53.3 50.6 53.1 52.9
female TURKSTAT- LFS 34.2 34.1 32.2 31.7 33.2 28.1 28.5 29.0 26.8 26.1 25.1
participation rate by educational categories
Total Age group 15+
   Illiterate TURKSTAT- LFS 35.4 34.2 34.5 34.9 31.5 29.5 31.5 32.9 32.3 29.1 29.6
   Below Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 55.3 55.5 55.1 54.8 54.1 53.6 54.1 55.3 53.6 49.4 49.7
   Upper Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 60.5 59.0 58.8 57.7 57.7 58.4 57.8 58.8 58.1 55.5 55.3
   Tertiary TURKSTAT- LFS 83.1 82.5 81.8 80.1 80.7 81.8 81.5 82.2 79.9 77.9 79.4
Male Age group 15+
   Illiterate TURKSTAT- LFS 62.5 62.4 62.2 61.5 58.7 57.0 58.2 56.7 54.7 54.1 54.9
   Below Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 78.9 79.0 78.8 78.9 79.0 78.7 78.7 78.9 77.1 73.5 74.1
   Upper Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 75.3 74.4 73.6 71.7 71.2 71.8 72.1 73.7 73.8 71.1 70.4
   Tertiary TURKSTAT- LFS 88.1 87.8 86.6 84.2 85.2 86.3 85.1 86.2 84.8 82.8 84.1
Female Age group 15+
   Illiterate TURKSTAT- LFS 28.5 26.9 27.6 28.2 24.4 22.6 25.1 27.2 26.8 22.9 23.4
   Below Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 29.0 29.1 28.8 28.3 26.6 25.8 27.0 29.2 27.7 23.1 23.1
   Upper Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 37.1 35.1 35.4 35.8 36.9 36.8 35.5 36.7 34.4 32.1 32.7
   Tertiary TURKSTAT- LFS 73.8 72.8 72.6 72.4 72.8 73.9 75.2 75.2 71.6 69.8 71.6
unemployment rate by educational categorie
Total Age group 15+
   Illiterate TURKSTAT- LFS 2.8 2.9 2.1 1.1 1.7 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.2 3.4 4.1
   Below Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 7.0 6.4 5.6 5.2 5.6 5.9 5.6 6.0 6.7 7.3 6.7
   Upper Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 14.6 13.6 13.8 14.4 14.9 14.5 13.9 15.1 14.4 12.4 11.1
   Tertiary TURKSTAT- LFS 6.4 6.3 6.7 6.9 6.8 7.1 8.4 8.7 8.1 7.6 6.5Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male Age group 15+
   Illiterate TURKSTAT- LFS 5.0 5.0 3.7 2.1 2.9 3.8 3.4 4.1 5.0 6.7 6.1
   Below Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 7.3 6.9 6.2 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.5 6.9 7.5 7.0
   Upper Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 11.7 10.7 11.3 11.4 11.0 11.0 11.4 12.5 12.0 10.3 9.4
   Tertiary TURKSTAT- LFS 5.6 5.1 5.8 5.7 5.4 5.9 7.2 7.7 6.8 5.8 5.3
Female Age group 15+
   Illiterate TURKSTAT- LFS 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.1 0.9 1.4 2.7
   Below Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 6.0 5.3 3.9 3.6 5.2 5.8 4.2 4.3 5.9 6.5 5.5
   Upper Secondary TURKSTAT- LFS 23.8 23.1 22.3 24.2 26.6 25.3 22.0 23.0 22.3 19.3 16.4
   Tertiary TURKSTAT- LFS 8.0 8.8 8.7 9.4 9.6 9.6 10.7 10.8 10.8 11.0 8.7
Regional labour market
employment rate by regions, NUTS 2
   max Population Census
Population Census data 
do not match Labour 
Force Survey Data. 
There could be some 
discrepancies. 67.6
   min Population Census 47.5
   standard deviation Population Census 5.4
unemployment rate by regions, NUTS 2
   max Population Census 14.8
   min Population Census 5.0
   standard deviation Population Census 2.8
Self-employment
rate of self-employment outside agriculture TURKSTAT 16.1 15.3 15.6 14.4 15.8 15.8 15.1 14.5 15.6 16.3 16.4
Legislative and regulatory framework
EBRD rating of legal effectiveness
Transparency International corruption index 4.10 3.54 3.21 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.5
WB Control of Corruption from Governance Indicators percentile rank 61.3 65.6 48.9 40.8 50.7
Privatisation and private sector development
Doing Business', Dealing with licenses - time days :::::::::: 2 3 2
Doing Business', Starting a business - duration
http://www.doingbusine
ss.org/ExploreTopics/St
artingBusiness/ days :::::::: 3 8 9 9
Doing Business', Starting a business - no. Of procedures
http://www.doingbusine
ss.org/ExploreTopics/St
artingBusiness/ :::::::: 1 3 8 8
WB Regulatory Quality from Governance Indicators
http://info.worldbank.or
g/governance/kkz2004/
mc_indicator.asp
percentil
e rank (0-
100) : 71.3 : 80.4 : 55.1 : 55.6 : 48.8 :
WB Government Effectiveness from Governance Indicators
http://info.worldbank.or
g/governance/kkz2004/
mc_indicator.asp
percentil
e rank (0-
100) : 62 : 41.5 : 52.7 : 55.2 : 57.2 :Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Structure of the economy
Value added by sector (% of total value added in the
economy)
   Industry CBRT 26.3 25.2 25.3 22.9 23.2 23.3 25.7 25.2 24.7 24.9 25.4
   Services CBRT 58.0 58.0 60.2 59.6 61.5 62.6 62.2 63.2 63.6 63.9 64.4
   Agriculture CBRT 15.7 16.9 14.5 17.5 15.3 14.1 12.1 11.6 11.7 11.2 10.3
Value added by sector - annual growth rates
   Industry CBRT 12.1 7.1 10.4 2.0 -5.0 6.0 -7.5 9.4 7.8 9.4
   Services CBRT 6.3 7.6 8.6 2.4 -4.5 8.9 -7.7 7.5 6.7 10.2
   Agriculture CBRT 2.0 4.4 -2.3 8.4 -5.0 3.9 -6.5 6.9 -2.5 2.0
Financial sector
Interest rate spread (GCR)
European Commission 
Progress Report 
Statistical Annex; State 
Planning Organisation www.dpt.gov.tr 13.4 6.4 6.4 -13.8 0.6 13 16.6 -0.2 2.5 5.5 4.6 3.4
Domestic credit and loans as share of GDP (including 
consumer loans and mortgages)
Turkish banking 
association; Banking 
Regulatory Authority www.bddk.org.tr 30.6 27 28 27.5 20.8 30.6 25.2 24 30.7
Share of population with access to basic banking services 
(including bank account)
Turkish banking 
association; Banking 
Regulatory Authority www.tbb.org.tr
Share of 3 largest banks in total assets
Turkish banking 
association; Banking 
Regulatory Authority 31.23 29.57 33.38 33.49 37.07 40.37 42.92 42.56 45.6
Share of 3 largest banks in total deposits
Turkish banking 
association; Banking 
Regulatory Authority 35.86 36.9 38.62 38.09 37.5 43.03 45.09 45.4 47.45
Education
enrolment rates at various stages of formal education TURKSTAT
   in primary education 87.6 92.6 97.6 100.7 99.8 96.3 96.1
   in secondary education 53.3 57.6 59.4 64 73.7 81 96.4
   in tertiary education 25.7 27.4 27.8 28 30.8 35.8 36.8Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
educational outcomes
PISA Math Test Scores
OECD, Education At A 
Glance PISA 2003 Results
Average Score 423
Std. Dev. Of  Score 6.7
Percentages
Less than Level 1 27.7
Level 1 24.6
Level 2 22.1
Level 3 13.5
Level 4 6.8
Level 5 3.1
Level 6 2.4
PISA Analytical Test Scores
Average Score 408
Std. Dev. Of  Score 6.0
Percentages 51.2
Less than Level 1 32.5
Level 1 12.4
Level 2 3.9
Level 3Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
Annex 5.2: Demography
source notes unit 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 2015 2020 2035
Population structure by age and 
gender
State Institude of Statistics 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Ver
iBilgi.do
2000 is a census 
year
total
 Total population 
for year 2000 and 
mid year total 
population 
estimates for years 
before 2000 and 
projections years 
after 2000 67 803 927 68,365,000 69,302,000 70,231,000 71,152,000 72,065,000 72,974,000 76,505,000 80,524,000 84,301,000 93,284,000
<15 20 220 095
15-64 43 701 502
over 65 3 858 949
male 34 346 735
female 33 457 192
Fertility
State Institude of Statistics 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Ver
iBilgi.do
average age of mothers at first birth 28.08 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.0 26.9 26.8
Family structure and changes
average family size
State Institude of Statistics 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Ver
iBilgi.do 4.50
Total number of households
State Institude of Statistics 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Ver
iBilgi.do 15 070 093
couples with no children
Household Budget Survey, 
2002 21.3
Projections
State Institude of Statistics 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Ver
iBilgi.do
projected fertility
Fertility rate for 
year 2000 and 
projected fertility 
rate for all other 
years 2.27 2.25 2.24 2.22 2.21 2.19 2.18 2.12 2.04 2.01 1.88
projected total dependency ratio 55.1
projected old-age dependency ratio 8.83
Youth dependency ratio 46.27Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
source notes unit 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010 2015 2020 2035
Ethnic minorities
Estimated by Servet 
Mutlu, "Ethnic Kurds in 
Turkey, A Demographic 
Study", International 
Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, vol 28, 1996, 
pp.517-541.
ethnic structure of the population; % of 
total population 1965 (%) 1965 1990 1990 (%)
Turkish 90.1 28,289,680
Arabic 1.2 365,340
Circassian 0.2 58,339
Kurdish 7.6 2,370,233 7,046,250 (%12.5)
Lazgi 0.1 26,007
Other 0.9 281,822
100 31,391,421 56,475,000Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
Annex 5.3: Living conditions
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Income distribution
World Bank LSMS methodogy
absolute poverty rate at general poverty line HBS, 2002, 2003 food+non-food 26.96 28.12
absolute poverty rate at food line HBS 2002, 2003 1.35 1.29
Laeken indicators
At-persistent-risk-of-poverty rate, total (50% median) HBS, 2002 % 18.64
At-persistent-risk-of-poverty rate, female (50% median) HBS, 2002 % 18.84
At-persistent-risk-of-poverty rate, male (50% median) HBS, 2002 % 18.42
Gini coefficient HBS, 2002 % 46.36
Dispersion of regional employment rates, total NUTS2 level Population Census, 2000 5.4
Early school leavers not in education or training Eurostat % 58.8 57.3 54.8 53 54.6 51.3
Persons with low educational attainment
OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/26/3371
0913.xls Below upper secondary % 78.06 77.82 76.50 76.17 74.82
Access to goods and services
percentage of households having electricity
HBS 2002-Poverty Assessment Report
2005 % 99
percentage of households connected to the gas pipe
HBS 2002-Poverty Assessment Report
2005 % 9.2
percentage of households with improved water source
HBS 2002-Poverty Assessment Report
2005 piped water system % 95.3
percentage of households having a home telephone
HBS 2002-Poverty Assessment Report
2005 86.4
percentage of households with internet access HBS, 2002; Eurostat (for 2004) 67
Work-life balance
weekly working hours, both genders
Household Labour Force Survey- Tunalı,
2003 48.8 52.1
weekly working hours, female
Household Labour Force Survey- Tunalı,
2003 41.2 44.7
weekly working hours, male
Household Labour Force Survey- Tunalı,
2003 50.1 53.7
frequency of difficulties reconciling work and family life  Eurobarameter, 2002 job prevents giving time to family % 28.3
Housing and local environment
number of rooms per persons EQLS 2003 1.1
proportion of persons living in own homes
EQLS 2003
HBS, 2002
Population Census, 2000
without mortgage % 57
owner occupier or rent-free % 80.85
owner % 68
complaints about environmental problems (noise, air pollution, wate
quality, etc) EQLS, 2003 %
noise 29
air pollution 29
lack of green space 45
water quality 41Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
physical distance from services
cash dispenser Eurobarameter 2002
Proportion of people aged 15 and
over who live within walking distance
or within 20 minutes of the nearest 
cash dispenser % 63.6
shop Eurobarameter 2002
Proportion of people aged 15 and 
over who live within walking distance
or within 20 minutes of the nearest 
supermarket or grocery store.  % 92.9
nursery Eurobarameter 2002
Proportion of people aged 15 and 
over who live within walking distance
or within 20 minutes of the nearest 
nursery or kindergarden.  % 63.5
Available Indicators
Percentage of households in which the head is unemployed HBS, 2002 % 8
Use of Internet EQLS, 2003
Percentage of people aged 15 (EQLS:
18 years) and over who use the 
Internet % 27
Share of Individuals who accessed, in the last three months the internet on 
average at least once a week (in %) 2004
Eurostat, 2004; Community Survey on
ICT Usage in Households and by 
individual
retired % 2.1
employees % 23.5
students % 44.2
unemployed % 16.6
Reporting Health as Poor (Turkey) EQLS, 2003 % 7
Proportion reporting long-standing illness or disability (for CC3 al
together) EQLS, 2003
lowest quartile 27
middle quartiles 24
highest quartile 17
Proportion reporting poor health (for CC3 all together) EQLS, 2003
lowest quartile 18
middle quartiles 10
highest quartile 4
Too tired to do household jobs EQLS, 2003 % 36
Difficulties in fullfilling family responsabilities EQLS, 2003 % 27
Difficulties in concentrating at work EQLS, 2003 % 11
number of rooms in housing units Population Census, 2000 %
1 room 2
2 room 9
3 room 37
4 room 40
5+ room 10
Employed persons working 48 or more hours per week Eurobarameter 2002 %  44
Reporting their health as bad and very bad TURKSTAT, 2004 (sample size 6714) % 16.7Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
Annex 5.4: Tax-benefit general
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Exchange rate
ave. annual exc. rate of national currency to USD Turkish Central Bank New TL per USD 0.04595 0.08180 0.15280 0.26223 0.42215 0.67267 1.23132 1.51310 1.50027 1.42920 1.34726 1.34836
ave. annual exc. rate of national currency to euro Turkish Central Bank New TL per euro : : : : 0.44783 0.57671 1.09896 1.43666 1.69343 1.77621 1.67759 1.64691
Social protection provisions
old-age
number of beneficiaries, total Total of SSK, BK and ES Persons 2,771,963 3,017,404 3,254,807 3,510,066 3,737,230 3,984,561 4,176,968 4,376,498 4,612,049 4,870,344
SSK SSK Persons 1,644,623 1,791,557 1,940,842 2,106,088 2,248,287 2,418,992 2,555,965        2,694,834          2,838,422             2,988,054                     3,036,831     
BK BK Persons 454,455 499,309 547,098 591,333 629,071 668,176 698,559 717,326 733,984 767,032 820,781
ES ES Persons 558,712 628,031 678,749 722,632 774,907 820,767 867,010 903,677 947,680 1,006,595 1,061,509 1,101,822
number of beneficiaries, female
SSK SSK 298,513 334,397 363,538
number of beneficiaries, male
SSK SSK 1,642,329 1,771,691 1,884,749
average benefit in local currency (Ave. monthly benefits
per person (for all individuals covered under old-age, 
disability and survivors programs): 2000-2005)
Calculated by dividing yearly benefit 
payments bill through the total 
numbers of beneficiaries covered by 
each soc. sec. agency
It is impossible to separate 
average benefits by the 
type of social protection
SSK New TL/month : : : : : 92.6 138.5 206.1 299.2 345.5 437.4
BK New TL/month : : : : : 61.2 90.6 135.4 246.6 297.4 339.2
ES New TL/month : : : : : 150.1 219.7 339.5 441.6 511.8 611.7
average benefit in euros
SSK USD/month : : : : : 160.6 126.0 143.4 176.7 194.5 260.7
BK USD/month : : : : : 106.2 82.4 94.2 145.6 167.4 202.2
ES USD/month : : : : : 260.3 200.0 236.3 260.8 288.1 364.7
average benefit as percentage of average net wage Replacement rates
SSK CSGB
Monthly pension 
income/Long run average 
of work income
% for each year 
worked 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5
BK
BK covers self-employed 
and hence there's no wage 
income
ES CSGB
Monthly pension 
income/Long run average 
of work income
% for each year 
worked 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5
number of new beneficiaries, total 329,914 304,141 299,549 322,780 348,404 351,970 313,454 332,582 329,989 374,640
SSK SSK 177,004 179,951 181,999 198,879 188,628 209,281 182,759 177,792 169,913 201,696
BK BK 45,779 61,100 60,750 59,747 57,658 100,106 68,522 62,593 70,892 75,926 91,622 20,987
ES ES 53,421 91,810 63,440 57,803 66,243 59,670 74,167 68,102 83,898 84,150 81,322
number of new beneficiaries, female
SSK SSK 27,134 29,367 30,329 35,343 32,921 34,441 34,243 34,365 31,200
number of new beneficiaries, male
SSK SSK 149,870 150,584 151,67 163,536 155,707 174,838 148,516 143,247 138,713
disability
number of beneficiaries, total Total of SSK, BK and ES Persons 91,501 93,776 96,262 99,285 101,987 105,106 106,809 107,103 109,612 109,044
SSK SSK Persons 55,629 56,239 57,214 58,685 59,742 61,649 62,542             62,709              63,071                  62,700                          62,913          
BK BK Persons 10,778 10,852 11,533 12,584 13,584 14,510 15,054 15,059 14,643 14,642 14,222
ES ES Persons 23,934 25,020 26,004 26,464 27,016 27,735 28,403 29,208 29,751 31,899 32,122
number of beneficiaries, female
SSK SSK 6,902 7,183 7,312
number of beneficiaries, male
SSK SSK 50,312 51,502 52,430
average benefit as percentage of average net wage
See replacement rates for 
old-age
number of new beneficiaries, total Persons 6,749 8,040 8,190 8,446 9,114 9,103 8,203 7,389 7,452
SSK SSK Persons 3,588 4,184 4,335 4,893 5,185 5,539 5,079 4,385 3,987
BK BK Persons 1,219 1,104 2,014 2,336 2,259 2,442 1,902 1,454 1,336 1,447 829
ES ES Persons 1,759 2,057 1,842 1,519 1,294 1,487 1,662 1,670 1,668 2,018 1,265
number of new beneficiaries, female
SSK SSK 300 385 423 481 538 619 518 513 397
number of new beneficiaries, male
SSK SSK 3,288 3,799 3,912 4,412 4,647 4,920 4,561 3,872 3,589Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
survivors
number of beneficiaries, total Total of SSK, BK and ES Persons 1,483,991 1,569,490 1,651,811 1,743,661 1,825,745 1,896,866 1,973,185 2,050,296 2,117,418 2,173,440
SSK SSK
Spouse, children and 
(eligible) parents together Persons 724,362 766,342 812,774 861,997 908,416 955,007 1,002,706 1,051,052          1,091,904             1,130,420                     1,147,775     
BK BK
Spouse, children and 
(eligible) parents together Persons 347,462 364,469 393,421 415,392 444,273 468,896 481,714 494,423 509,996 529,432 540,678 624,600
ES ES
Spouse and children 
together Persons 369,714 395,160 409,727 423,645 437,391 448,433 460,145 476,056 489,248 496,082 502,342 504,757
number of beneficiaries, female
number of beneficiaries, male
average benefit as percentage of average net wage
number of new beneficiaries, total
SSK SSK
Spouse, children and 
(eligible) parents together Persons 85,856 90,634 89,215 89,558 94,113 91,138 92,065 80,992
BK Persons
ES ES
Spouse and children 
together Persons 27,003 26,111 26,570 26,229 26,585 23,653 28,457 29,302 24,849 40,337 40,705
number of new beneficiaries, female
SSK SSK 71,805 77,111 78,349 68,929
number of new beneficiaries, male
SSK SSK 22,308 14,027 13,716 12,063
family and children
number of beneficiaries, total
Dependents of employees 
actively contributing to 
obtain benefits from a soc. 
sec. agency
SSK State Planning Organization 21,469,875 22,541,181 21,592,466 22,993,730 24,610,697 26,771,763 29,123,424
BK State Planning Organization 10,581,159 10,832,989 11,051,955 11,266,245 11,035,587
ES State Planning Organization 4,980,651 5,255,878 5,363,274 5,331,249 5,272,130
unemployment
number of beneficiaries, total
Unemployment insurance 
was introduced in mid-
2002 Persons 87,337 133,080 151,841 186,207 38,046
number of beneficiaries, female Persons 22,922 33,200 40,959 48,905 8,998
number of beneficiaries, male Persons 64,415 99,880 110,882 137,302 29,048
average benefit in local currency
New YTL per 
month : : : : : : : 157.97 184.80 240.15 255.10 267.65
average benefit in euro Euro per month : : : : : : : 109.95 109.13 135.20 152.07 162.52
average benefit as percentage of average net wage 66.81 60.39 55.39 52.20 50.41
number of new beneficiaries, total
Public social expenditure
consolidated general government expenditure in local 
currency 
Revenue Administration (Gelir Idaresi 
Baskanligi--GIB)
thousand New TL 
(or Bn TL) 1,724,194 3,961,308 8,050,252 15,614,441 28,084,685 46,705,028 80,579,065 115,682,350 140,454,842 152,169,930 157,044,049
consolidated general government expenditure as 
percentage of GDP Calculated using GDP data from SPO 22.2 26.8 27.9 29.9 36.3 37.5 45.2 41.7 39.0 35.3 32.3
Taxation
taxes on labour as percentage of total tax revenues Revenue Administration (GIB)
Share of Income Tax in 
Total Tax Revenue 2005 19.1
taxes on capital as percentage of total tax revenues Revenue Administration (GIB)
Share of Corporate Taxes 
in Total Tax Revenue 2005 9.6
taxes on consumption as percentage of total tax revenues Revenue Administration (GIB)
Share of Value Added 
Taxes in Total Tax 
Revenue 2005 32.1
tax wedge on labour cost for low earners Eurostat
relative tax burden for an 
employed person with low 
earnings 42.1 43.5 43.0 34.5 39.1 42.6 41.5 41.0 41.9 41.9Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
rate of contribution revenues to total expenses in social 
security funds
SSK SSK
Contribution 
Revenue/Total Expenses 
for 2005 (Contribution 
Rev./Benefit Payments for 
2005) % 53.5 (91.0)
BK BK
Contribution 
Revenue/Total Pension 
Payments 2004 % 32.2
ES ES
Contribution 
Revenue/Total Expenses 
for 2005 % 61.8
proportion of revenues of social security funds by source
employer’s contributions
SSK Sosyal Guvenlik Kurumu
Employer share within the 
average contribution rate % 11
BK CSGB
Average contribution rate. 
For BK covering the self-
employed, employer and 
employee are the same % 20
contributions by protected persons
SSK Sosyal Guvenlik Kurumu
Employee share within the 
average contribution rate % 9
ES CSGB
Employee share within the 
average contribution rate % 36
transfers from government
Transfers in 
2005 [A]
Revenues + 
Transfers  [B] [A]/[B]  (in %)
SSK
Transfers plus revenues / 
Revenues New TL (2005) 7,507,000,000 29,479,650,000 25.5
BK
Transfers plus revenues / 
Revenues New TL (2004) 6,926,000,000 11,167,518,000 62.0
ES
Transfers plus revenues / 
Revenues New TL (2005) 4,539,000,000 14,095,918,351 32.2
Gender equality and anti-discrimination
number of senior and junior ministers in government by 
BEIS-type to the EU average 
Number of ministries and 
percentage of men at n1 
and n2 levels
Data collected: 2005/2006
B Senior M4 - 100% 
B Junior: 3 - 100%
E Senior 3 - 100%
E Junior 1- 100% 
I Senior:  4 - 100%
I Junior 1- 100% 
S Senior: 4 - 100% 
S Junior: 1- 100% 
number of representatives in the Parliament to the EU 
average
President: M
Members: 
W:24 (4%)
M: 526 (96%)
rate of female members of the highest decision making 
body of the top 50 publicly quoted companies
President: 4 %
Members: 6%
CEO: 2% Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
Annex 5.5: Tax-benefit IMF2001
source notes unit 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Aggregate social expenditure in local currency, IMF Government Finance Statistics 2001 classification
Expenditures on … by consolidated general government
health Ministry of Finance
Budget of the Ministry of 
Health as part of the 
consolidated budget New TL 1,059,855,000 1,280,660,000 2,355,447,691 3,723,749,000 4,554,490,337 5,447,962,016
Expenditures on … by central government
… of which expenditures on … by social security funds
health
family and children 
included
SSK SSK New YTL 1,280,188,800 2,257,957,600 3,594,350,100 4,981,193,700 6,635,691,000 7,457,105,000 9,369,662,000
BK BK New YTL 730,296,000 1,228,849,000 2,195,308,000 3,183,146,000 3,719,356,000
ES ES New YTL 1,840,221,231 2,505,626,442 2,755,094,289 2,891,133,628 746,518,000
sickness and disability, old age and survivors
SSK SSK New YTL 3,574,600,000 5,708,300,000 8,953,900,000 8,954,900,000 11,960,500,000 16,555,700,000
BK BK New YTL 1,136,329,700 1,780,218,900 2,760,011,800 4,763,725,000 5,981,152,000
ES ES New YTL 5,740,351,965 7,772,504,522 9,425,347,462 11,067,750,667 2,995,200,000Annex 5 | Turkey - other indicators
Annex 5.6: Governance
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Government effectiveness
World Bank Governance Matters indices on
government effectiveness WB 41.5 57.2
regulatory quality WB 80.4 48.8
rule of law WB 65.9 54.6
Social protection performance in old-age pensions
average claim handling time of benefits
January for 2006
December for 2005 66 74.6
percentage of personnel cost SSK
Social Security Fund 
(SSK) 84 69 54 63 69 70
Administrative barriers to firm entry/exit
number of procedures of starting a business WB- Doing Business 8
duration of starting a business in days WB- Doing Business 9
cost of starting a business as % of per capita GNI WB- Doing Business 27.7
time required for closing a business in years WB- Doing Business actual time in years 5.9
cost of closing a business as % of estate WB- Doing Business 7
recovery rate WB- Doing Business 7.2
Civil society organizations
religious service attendance  EQLS 2003 % 41About ENEPRI 
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